Compute the following microeconomic equations. If any clarifications are needed please leave a comment.

The inverse demand function for developed land in the city of Kingston is p = 100 ? 0.5Q where Q is the quantity (measured in acres) and p is the price per acre.

The inverse demand function for developed land in the city of Kingston is p = 100 - 0.5Q where Q is the quantity (measured in acres) and p is the price per acre. (i) Assume for the moment that firm A has the exclusive right to develop land in the city of Kingston. Then firm A is the monopolist in this market, and thus Q = qA where qA denotes the number of acres developed by firm A. Find firm A's output level that would maximize its profit, if firm A's marginal cost is MCA = 10. Denote this output level by q" (where the superscript m indicates that this is the monopoly solution). Compute the monopoly's profit, and denote it by a (ii) Now assume that the mayor of Kingston allows two firms, firm A and firm B, to develop land in Kingston. Assume that the two firms compete as Cournot rivals: the firms set their quantities qa and q8, and the resulting market price is p = 100-0.5qA -0.598. Suppose that the mayor requires that the two firms choose their output levels simultaneously. Assume that the marginal cost of firm B is MCB = 10 = MCA. Find each firm's best- response curve. Find their Nash-Cournot equilibrium outputs, and denote them by q qp. Find the Nash-Cournot equilibrium price (denoted by p"), and find the profit of each firm at the Nash-Cournot equilibrium (denoted by of and ~9)