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Consider a community inhabited by n goat-farmers, n > 1, each of whom owns goats that graze on a common field. If Farmer i, i

Consider a community inhabited by n goat-farmers, n > 1, each of whom owns goats that graze on a common field. If Farmer i, i = 1, . . . , n, sends gi goats to the field, he/she earns i(g1, . . . , gn) = giV (G) 10gi , where V (G) = 15. (So value per goat is constant at 15.)

(a) A Nash equilibrium does not exist. Why?

(b) The phenomenon "Tragedy of the Commons" does not

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