Consider a crime that, if committed, would impose a harm of $$100$ on the victim. Suppose that there are two potential offenders: Adam and Bob. Adam gains $$40$ from committing the crime, while Bob gains $$80$ from committing the crime. Assume that the probability of apprehension and conviction is fixed at $0\mathrm{.}5.$

Is it efficient for either of the offenders to commit the crime? $[$ Select $]["$Yes$.","$No$."]$

Suppose the fine is set equal to the actual harm of $$100.($Think of Hammurabi's Code$"$An eye for an eye."$)$

Will Adam commit the crime? $[$ Select $]["$Yes$.","$No$."]$

Will Bob commit the crime? $[$ Select $]["$Yes$.","$No$."]$

What is the optimal harm$-$based fine? f$*=$ $$[$ Select $]["20","25","40","50","80","100","160","200"]$

Given the optimal harm$-$based fine, will Adam commit the crime? $[$ Select $]["$Yes$.","$No$."]$

Given the optimal harm$-$based fine, will Bob commit the crime? $[$ Select $]["$Yes$.","$No$."]$