Consider a game between two players, a Principal and an Agent. The Principal is endowed with $100, which she can keep for herself or transfer to the Agent. Suppose, the Principal transfers M and keeps 100 - M. Any transferred amount is doubled and is given to the Agent. That is, the Agent receives 2M. The Agent then decides how much of the 2M to return to the Principal. Suppose the agent returns N and keeps 2MN. The final payoffs in the game are 2MN for the Agent and 100M+N for the Principal. a) Write the extensive form of the game. (5 points) b) Assuming both the Principal and the Agent are only concerned with maximizing their private monetary reward, what are the predictions of the two players' decisions? (5 points) c) Now suppose that the two players are inequity averse with a utility function proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) with the standard assumption that and 0