Consider a game where Player 1 selects Up or Down. Player 2 chooses simultaneously (without knowing what Player 1 has decided) between Left and Right. Payoffs are as follows. Player 2 Left Right Player 1 Up 7, 5 1, 3 Down 5, 2 2, 4 How many Nash equilibria does this game have? This game has no Nash equilibria. One. O Two. Three. Consider a game where Player 1 selects Up or Down. Player 2 chooses simultaneously (without knowing what Player 1 has decided) between Left and Right. Payoffs are as follows. Player 2 Left Right Player 1 Up 3, 5 1, 6 Down 5, 2 2, 4 If this game is repeated infinitely often, with a 10% probability of termination after each round, can one or more of the players use a trigger strategy to get a better outcome for themselves? No, none of the players can do better by playing trigger strategies. Yes, Player 2 can do better by threatening to play Left unless Player 1 plays Down. Yes, Player 1 can do better by threatening to play Up unless Player 2 plays Right. Yes, both players can do better by playing trigger strategies