Consider a game where the following game will be played twice (t=1,2)

	L	C	R
U	1,1	0,0	0,0
M	0,0	4,6	6,4
D	0,0	6,4	4,6

(1) Find at least four subgame perfect equilibria of the game

(2) Find a Nash Equilibrium of the game which is not SPE

Answers I found on Chegg

(1) MC, MR, DC, and DR.

* I understand that these are subgame perfect equilibria of the game if one shot, but what about when the game is played twice? My teacher writes the subgame perfect equilibria in the form of (U,L) (U,L) in a game repeated twice. If this is not the case, could you explain why?

(2) UL

* Same question as (1), what about the outcome when the game is played twice?

I'm still in the learning process of repeated games and it is really confusing so it would be really helpful if you could give me a detailed response.