Consider a homogenous good market with the following market demand curve: q =10 p. Two firms produce output at cost C(q) = 2q. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e S (f) If the two firms set the prices simultaneously, what is the market price in equilibrium? How much will each firm produce in this case? If the two firms set the quantities simultaneously, what is the market price in equi- librium? How much will each firm produce in this case? If firm 1 chooses the quantity ; firstly and firm 2 chooses its quantity , after observing q;, what is the market price in equilibrium? How much will each firm produce in this case? If the two firms collude, produce in the monopolistic way and split the profit, what is the market price in equilibrium? How much will each firm produce in this case? If firm 1 produces as agreed in the collusion case (d) and firm 2 deviates by producing optimally given firm 1's choice, what is the market price in equilibrium? How much will each firm produce in this case? Suppose now that the two firms will stay in the market infinitely, what are the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) ? Please list two examples and explain the reason why they are SPNEs