Consider a labor market with an upward-sloping inverse labor supply curve. Consider now two scenarios. In the first scenario, the labor market is competitive. In the second scenario, only one firm hires labor. That is, the labor market is monopsonistic. Choose one or more: A. A binding minimum wage will be Pareto-decreasing over the equilibrium outcome in both markets. B. A binding minimum wage can be Pareto-improving over the equilibrium outcome in both markets. C. A binding minimum wage will be Pareto-improving over the equilibrium outcome in both markets. D. A binding minimum wage can be Pareto-improving over the equilibrium outcome in the competitive market and Pareto-decreasing over the equilibrium outcome in the monopsonistic market. E. A binding minimum wage can be Pareto-improving over the equilibrium outcome in the monopsonistic market and Pareto-decreasing over the equilibrium outcome in the competitive market. F. A binding minimum wage can be Pareto-decreasing over the equilibrium outcome in both markets