Consider a market where inverse market demand is p = 100-Q (where Q denotes aggregate output) and every rm faces a constant marginal cost of MC = 10. a) If two rms exist in this market (Q=q1+q2) and they compete a la Cournot, how much quantity does each rm produce, and how much prot does each rm make? b) Suppose the two rms decide to collude and form a cartel. Assuming they cooperate, how much they produce, and how much prot each rm make? Compare the prots under Cournot competition (from part 3) against prots under collusion. c) Consider the following grim trigger strategy: every rm starts colluding in period 1, and it keeps doing as long as both rms colluded in the past. Otherwise, when one rm breaks the cartel agreement, the other rm reverts back to the non-cooperative agreement (Cournot equilibrium) forever after. What is the minimum probability adjusted discount factor required to sustain collusion