Consider a pooling equilibrium in the signaling model where education is not productive. Assume > 0. Q3.1 1 Point The Type L workers get the efficient amount of education. O True O False Save Answer Q3.2 1 Point The Type H workers get the efficient amount of education. True O False Save Answer Q3.3 1 Point The Type L workers would prefer to get no education and get paid a wage equal to the marginal product of labor for Type Ls. O True O False Save Answer Q3.4 Point The Type H workers would prefer to get no education and get paid a wage equal to the marginal product of labor for Type Hs. O True O False Save Answer Q3.5 1 Point Relative to the symmetric information equilibrium, the Type L workers are worse-off (i.e., have lower utility) in the pooling equilibrium. O True O False Save Answer Q3.6 1 Point Relative to the symmetric information equilibrium, the Type H workers are worse-off (i.e., have lower utility) in the pooling equilibrium. O True O False Save Answer