Consider a price competition game between two manufacturing firms, American Paper Optics (APO) and Thousand Oaks Optical (TOOQ). each of which sells solar eclipse glasses. Each player can set the price to be $5 or $3 for a pair of glasses. If they both set a high price. each receives profits of $16.000 per year. If they both set a low price, each receives profits of $14.000 per year. If one sets a low price and the other sets a high price. the low-price firm receives profits of $18,000 per year while the high-price firm receives profits of $5.000 per year. (a) What are the Nash equilibrium strategies and payoffs in the one-shot simultaneous game 1f the two firms make price decisions only once? (b) If the two firms play the game for 3 years. what are each firm's total profits at the end of the three years (assuming discount factor of 1. 1.e. do not discount future payoifs) () Suppose that the firms play this price competition game repeatedly forever. Let each of them use the grim trigger strategy, where they both charge high price unless one of them charges low price. in which case they both price low thereafter. Suppose that the firms do not discount future payotfs. and there is a 20% probability that the repeated game ends 1 any given year because at least one of them may go bankrupt. Will the firms cooperate by pricing high