Consider a rst-price sealed bid auction with n risk-neutral bidders [we've been examining risk neutral bidders all along}. Each bidder has a private value independently drawn from a uniform distribution on [0,20]. That is, for each bidder, all values between 0 and 20 are equally likely. The complete strategy of each bidder is a bid function that will tell us. for any value v, what amount blv} that bidder will choose to bid. It is proposed that the equilibrium bid function for n= 2 is blv} =V/2 for each of the two bidders. That is, if we have two bidders. each should bid half her value. a) Suppose you're bidding against just one opponent whose value is uniformly distributed on [020] and always bids half her value. What is the probability that you will win if you bid b=5? lfyou bid b=9? If you bid b=11? b} Put together the answers to part a). What is the correct mathematical expression for p(win), the probability that you win, as a function of your bid b? c) Find an expression for the expected prot you make when your value is v and your bid is b. given that your opponent is bidding half her value. Remember that there are two cases: either you win the auction or you lose the auction. You need to average the prot between these cases. d] What is the value of b that maximizes your expected prot? This should be a function of yourvalue v. e} Use your results to argue that it is a NE for both bidders to follow the same bid function blv) =v/2