Consider a setting where two firms (A and B) are in an infinitely repeated Cournot competition between them. The discount factor is 6 G (0, 1). The inverse demand curve is given by P = 2 Q. The marginal cost of both firms is 1. Suppose that both firms play Grim Trigger Strategies. ** Part a (5 marks) Solve the monopoly level of output q'". ** Part b (5 marks) Find the output of each firm under cooperation. ** Part c (5 marks) Solve the one-period payoff that can be obtained by one firm under cooperation (denoted by if). ** Part d (5 marks) Solve the one-period payoff that can be obtained if the game is only played once (denoted by 7:\"). ** Part e (5 marks) If Firm 1 decides to deviate from the Grim Trigger strategy profile for one period, what is the optimal output that Firm 1 should produce? ** Part f (5 marks) If Firm 1 decides to deviate from the Grim Trigger strategy profile, what is the market price in the deviation penod? ** Part 9 (5 marks) What is Firm 1's profit in the deviation period 1rd ? ** Part h (5 marks) Given the values of 7:\