Consider a simultaneous game between Jimmy and Kate. The payoff matrix is as follows. Kate W X Y Z A 100, 90 300, 90 150, 300 90, 100 \"mm B 50, 300 150, 250 100, 250 80, 150 Y C 300, 100 200, 100 300, 150 100, 120 D 150, 150 250, 200 250, 100 150, 300 (a) Indicate whether there is any dominant strategy or dominated strategy. ('3) (C) Eliminate the dominated strategy (if any) and show the simplied payoff matrix aer successive elimination of dominated strategies (10 marks) Analyse and nd the pure strategy equilibrium, if any exists, for the game. Explain why if there is none. (4 marks) Find the mixed strategy equilibrium for the game. (8 marks)