Consider a simultaneous move game played by two players. Each player's action set isand the utility function of playeris

whereand= 20,= 10. Which one of the following is NOT a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game?

a. (t*1,t*2)=(0,20) b.(t*1,t*2)=(10,0) c.(t*1,t*2)=(10,20) d.(t*1,t*2)=(0,30)

Consider a simultaneous move game played by two players. Each player's action set is [O, co ) and the utility function of player / is -ti if ti t ; where i * j and V1 = 20, V2 = 10. Which one of the following is NOT a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game? O a. (t ],t2 ) = (0, 20) Ob. (t),t?) = (10, 0) Oc. (th, t;) = (10, 20) O d. (t ) , t; ) = (0, 30) O e. (th ,t, ) = (30, 0)