Question
Consider an arbitrary marriage problem in which agents on one side, say women, have the same preference ordering of the men. Find a stable matching.
Consider an arbitrary marriage problem in which agents on one side, say women, have the same preference ordering of the men. Find a stable matching. Is it a unique stable matching? If so, prove its uniqueness. Otherwise, provide a counter example.
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Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications
Authors: Kenneth H. Rosen
7th edition
0073383090, 978-0073383095
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