Question
Consider an auction with one item and three bidders. Each bidder's private valuation is independently drawn from U[4,10]. (a) Find an equilibrium of a second-price
Consider an auction with one item and three bidders. Each bidder's private valuation is independently drawn from U[4,10].
(a) Find an equilibrium of a second-price auction. (b) Provide the formula of the expected payo of a bidder with value v in [4,10]. (c) Find an equilibrium bidding strategy of the rst-price auction using the revenue equivalence theorem.
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An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes Of The Wealth Of Nations
Authors: Adam Smith, R H Campbell
1st Edition
0865970068, 9780865970069
