. Consider and inverse market demand P(Q) = 10 2Q. Suppose there are two rms competing in prices (Bertrand). Compute the equilibrium price set by each rm and the quantities sold in the equilibrium. Also, compute each rms' prots in equilibrium when: (a) Both rms have constant marginal cost equal to c = 5. (b) One rm has marginal cost equal to CH = 5 the other one with marginal cost equal to cL = 2. (c) One rm has marginal cost equal to CH 2 8 the other one with marginal cost equal to cL = 2. . Consider and inverse market demand P(Q) = 10 Q. Suppose there are two rms competing in prices (Bertrand). One rm has marginal cost equal to CH 2 8 the other one with marginal cost equal to CL = 2. An inventor has designed a new manufacturing process that would reduce the marginal cost of production to c = 1. The inventor has three options: (a) Sell the invention to rm 1 only. (b) Sell the invention to rm 2 only. (c) Sell the invention to both rms. In this case, assume that both rms understand that the inventor is also selling the invention to their respective rival. In either alternative, the inventor will use a \"lump-sum\" contract, i.e., it will sell the invention for a xed fee F . Compute the inventor's prot for each licensing alternative. Which one maximizes the inventor's payoff