Consider Spence's educational signaling model with 2/3 of the workers being high type with productivity 50, and 1/3 of the workers being low type with productivity 30. Assume that an MBA program, that a worker can go to before the job market, takes two years to complete, and it costs 5 per year for high types and 10 per year for low types. a) Is there a pooling equilibrium with both types attending the MBA pro- gram? b) Is there a pooling equilibrium with neither type attending the MBA pro- gram? If yes, what can be firms' out of equilibrium beliefs be about a job applicant showing up with an MBA degree? c) Is there a separating equilibrium? d) Is there an equilibrium in which the high types mix, i.e. some of them get an MBA degree while some of them don't? If yes, what are the strategies of the two types in such equilibrium?