Consider the Conrot duopoly game with incomplete information. First, mature hanses a. number x, which is equally likely to to 8 or I. This number represent whether demand is high (x = 8) or low (x = 4). Fim 1 observes x because this firm has performed market research and knows the demand curve. Firm I dont. not observe x. Then the two firms simultaneously select quantities. q and q2 and the market price is determined by p = x -q -92. Assume that the firm produce at. zero cost. Thus, the payoff of firm 1 is (x -q1 -92)q1. and the payof ol' lirm 2 is (x - q1 - 92)92. fa: Nore that there are two types of firm 1, the high type (observing x = 8) and the low type (observing x = 4). Let qH and of denote the quantity choices of the high and low types of firm 1. Calculate the players' best-response functions. (b) Find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game. lo; Doo firm 1't information give it an advantage over form 2 in this garno? Quanrity this