Consider the Cournot model of duopolistic competition, where the inverse demand function is p = 1 q1 q; , and marginal costs are equal to c1 and (:2, respectively. Hence, rms 1 and 2 simultaneously choose quantities (q1,q2) in order to maximize prots, II; = (p - c,)q,,,i = 1,2. Quantities must be nonnegative: q, 2 0, and also assume that; > c1 > c2 > 0. 3. Compute each rm's best response to the rival's pure strategy. b. Compute the Nash equilibrium of this game. c. Suppose now that firm 1 delegates its quantity decision to a manager whose salary is an increasing function of revenue, pm. Hence, :11 will be chosen in order to maximize revenue, whereas rm 2 still maximizes profits. Compute the Nash equilibrium of the new game. How is firm 2's prots affected by the firm 1's delegation? Explain