Consider the demand for the wide-body aircraft industry. Suppose that there are two countries with segmented markets, the US and Europe, each with one maker of aircraft, Boeing in the US and Airbus in Europe. By segemented, we mean that no arbitrage between them by intermediaries is allowed. This means that a different price can prevail in the two markets. Only Boeing and Airbus can transport aircraft from one country to the other. The demand curve for film in each country is given by the equation Q = 140 P (2) where P represents the price of aircraft and Q the quantity sold. As far as consumers are concerned, there is no difference between the two brands, i.e., the good is homogeneous and the two companies compete as Cournot oligopolistic in both markets. That is, each takes the other's output as given in choosing its own output. The marginal cost of producing aircraft for both competitors in both 2 markets is constant equal to 20. Assume to begin with that there are no transport costs involved in trade