Consider the following discrete version of Bayesian Cournot duopoly with asymmetric information. Firm 1 has only one type but Firm 2 has has either low cost or high cost with equal probability. Firm 2 knows his cost level but Firm 1 does not know Firm 2's cost level. Each firm (of each type) chooses whether to produce high (Qh) or low output (Qe). The game is illustrated as follows. 1 2 Qh Qe 1 2 Qe -2, -2 2, 0 2, 2 2, 1 Qe 0, 2 0, 0 Qe 0, 3 6, 6 H Cost L Cost Probability: 0.5 Probability: 0.5 Solve for all Bayesian-Nash equilibria of this game (in pure and mixed strategies)