Consider the following extensive form game. 1.1 R 2. 2.2 A B A B 3.1 7, 8, 5 6, 4, 3 8, 2,5 4,7, 5 6, x, 6 Which of the following is true? (Here a description of the game: At the initial node, Player 1 chooses between L and R. After observing Player 1's choice, Player 2 chooses between A and B. If Players 1 and 2 choose L and B, respectively, the game ends with the payoffs (7,8,5). If Players 1 and 2 choose R and A, respectively, the game ends with the payoffs (6,4,3). If Players 1 and 2 choose R and B, respectively, the game ends with the payoffs (8,2,5). If Players 1 and 2 choose L and A respectively, then Player 3 chooses between I and r. If Player 3 chooses I, the game ends with the payoffs (4,7,5). If Player 3 chooses r, the game ends with the payoffs (6,x,6).) O This game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if X 8. None of the other alternatives is true