Consider the following extensive form game Mith perfect information]: There is a Son {Player 1) and a Father {Player 2}. At the initial node 1.1. Son chooses whether to Obey [0} or Rebel {R}. If Son chooses D the game ends with Son. Father payoffs equal to {43). If Son chooses R. then we reach node 2.1. Father chooses whether to Punish {P} or be Lenient {L}. Father chooses L the game ends with Son, Father payoffs equal to (5.0). If Father chooses P: then we reach node 1.2 and Son chooses whether to Accept {A} or Fight (F). If Son chooses A the game ends with Son. Father payoffs equal to (2.1). If Son chooses F the game ends with Son. Father payoffs equal to [1.0). Which statement if true for this game? The payoffs of Son and Father in the subgame perfect equilibrium are (1:0)- The payoffs of Son and Father In the subgame perfect equilibrium are (5.0}- .... The payoffs of Son and Father in the subgame perfect equilibrium are [4.3). "' None of the other statements is true. _ The payoffs of Son and Father in the subgame perfect equilibrium are [2.1)