Consider the following extensive form game {with perfect information]: I There is a Son (Player 1} and a Father (Player 2}. At the initial node 1.1, Son chooses whether to Obey (0} or Rebel {R}. If Son chooses O the game ends with Son. Father payoffs equal to {3.3}. If Son chooses R. then we reach node 2.1. Father chooses whether to Punish {P1 or he Lenient {L}. Father chooses L the game ends with Son, Father payoffs equal to MD}. If Father chooses P. then we reach node 1.2 and Son chooses whether to Accept (A) or Fight [FL If Son chooses A the game ends with So n. Father payoffs equal to [2,1 1. If Son chooses F the game ends with Son. Father payoffs equal to (140]. Which statement iftrue for this game? 0 The payoffs of Son and Father in the subgame perfect equilibrium are {1.0). {Q The payoffs of Son and Father in the subgame perfect equilibrium are {3.3). O The payoffs of Son and Father in the subgame perfect equilibrium are {2.1). O The payoffs of Son and Father in the subgame perfect equilibrium are {4.0). 0 None of the other statements is true