Consider the following game. (Albus's payoff is listed first in the payoff pair, Minerva's second.) Game Tree for Albus with a decision to go N or S. If Albus played N and Minerva can go a with a payoff of 3, 3, or B where Albus can do N with a payoff of 5, 2 or S with a payoff of 1, 3 or go C with a payoff of 0, 4. If Albus played S then Minerva could play a for a payoff of 2, 2 or B with a payoff of 2, 1. Find the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (show the complete decision paths on the tree). Convert this to the strategic form. Make Albus the row player, Minerva the column player. Find all of the Nash equilibria. For the equilibria you found in part (b) that are not subgame-perfect, identify the credibility problems