Consider the following game. j Lucy and Boo are partners in several group projects tor a course. Three of these group projects, A, B and C, are due tomorrow Both players have time to work on exactly one project tonight Projects A and B can he completed byyust M a, one person, while C can only be completed if both partners work on rt. The players cannot communicate with each other and must choose simultaneously which project each will won: on. Projects A B and C are worth 4. 2 and 6 points respectively. If a project is completed. both partners get the points associated with it. if a prmect is not completed, both players get 0 for it; It more than one project is completed, both players getthe sum 01 the points associated wrlh the completed projects. Players' payoffs are the total points they earn. How many Nash eouillpna in pure strategies does this game have? Selectone: O a. Cl 0 I11 Consrder the following game. I Lucy and Boo are partners in several group projects for a course. Three of these group projects, A, B and C, are due tomorrow Both players have time to work on exactly one project tonight Projects A and B can he completed hyjust "my one person. while C can only be completed if both partners work on it. The players cannot communicate with each other and must choose simultaneously which project each will work on. Protects A. B and C are worth 4. 2 and 6 points respectively. If a project is completed, both partners get the points associated with It. It a protect Is not completed, both players get 0 for It. It more than one proyect l5 completed, both players get the sum of the points associated with the completed projects. Players' payoffs are the total points they earn. How many rnadmlssiole Nash equilrpna does this game have? Select one: C a D O D. 'I Consrder the following game. I Lucy and Boo are partners in several group projects for a course. Three of these group projects, A, B and C, are due tomorrow Both players have time to work on exactly one project tonight Projects A and B can he completed hyjust "my one person, while C can only be completed if both partners worlr on it. The players cannot communicate with each other and musl choose simultaneously which project each will wont on. Protects A. B and C are worth 4. 2 and 6 points respectively. If a project is completed, both partners get the points associated with It. It a protect Is not completed, both players get 0 for It. It more than one proyect l5 completed, both players get the sum of the points associated with the completed projects. Players' payoffs are the total points they earn. Does there exist a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this game in which C is never played by either player with positive probabllitjfiI Select one: Q a. No such NE exists 0 D- Yes, and in it. both players play A with probability 113 O 0- Yes, and in it. both players play A with probability 112 Q d. Yes, and in it, both players play A with probability 213 The market inverse demand in an industry is given by p(Q) = 20 - Q. The industry is a duopoly, with two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2. They are the only sellers in the market, so q1 + q2 = Q. The firms' total cost functions are as follows: For Firm 1, C1 (q1 ) = 2g1 and for Firm 2, C2 (q2) = 2q2- ut of If the firms compete as Cournot competitors, what quantity will each produce in equilibrium? Answer. The market inverse demand in an industry is given by p(Q) = 20 - Q. The industry is a duopoly, with two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2. They are the only sellers in the market, so q1 + q2 = Q. The firms' total cost functions are as follows: For Firm 1, c1 (q1 ) = 2q and for Firm 2, c2 (q2) = 2q2. It of If the firms compete as Bertrand competitors, what quantity will each produce in equilibrium? Answer.You work for a consulting firm that helps its clients organise and design auctions. Consider the following scenario. Bidders have independent valuations and are risk-neutral. The client knows that revenue equivalence holds in this case, so he cannot increase revenue by changing the auction format. The client would like to gather as much information about demand for the good as he can. Suggest an auction format.Consider the following game: 3 players can contribute or not to a public good. For the public good to be successfully created, 2 contributions are necessary (an extra third contribution would not add anything to the public good). These are the payoffs each of the three players assign to all possible outcomes: ut of 4: I didn't contribute but the public good was created anyway 3: 1 did contribute and the public good was created 2: I didn't contribute and the public good was not created 1: 1 did contribute and the public good was not created The decisions are made sequentially: player 1 moves, then player 2, then player 3. Select all that apply about the SPNE of this game. Select one or more: O a. no one contributes O b. A and B contribute, C doesn't O C. All strategy profiles with 2 players contributing are SPNE O d. A does not contribute in any SPNE O e. Everyone contributesConsider the following signalling game: out of Nature not not Bad 0, 0 0, 0 Good seller seller advertise advertise Consumer b b n h 6, 10 1, 0 1, -5 -4, 0 Is there a pooling equilibrium in this game in which everyone advertises? Select one: O a. No O b. Yes, and in it, consumers buy the advertised product O C. Yes, and in it, consumers don't buy the advertised productConsider the following signalling game: ut of Nature not 0, 0 Good Bad not 0, 0 seller seller advertise advertise Consumer b b n n 6, 10 1,0 1, -5 -4, 0 Is there a pooling equilibrium in this game in which no one advertises? Explain briefly.in der the t10 Consider the following signalling game: ut of Nature not not 0, 0 Good Bad 0, 0 seller seller advertise advertise Consumer b b n 6, 10 1, 0 1, -5 -4, 0 Is there a separating equilibrium in this game? Explain briefly