Consider the following game. The payoffs are presented in the following the order: (Albus, Minerva, Severus). 1,3, 1 N ALBUS X S 2,4,0 SEVERUS a 0,2,3 a MINERVA MINERVA N b b 10,4,4 14, 1,5 ALBUS S 2, 1, 1 At the Backward Induction Equilibrium of his game, Albus plays the strategy S/S Minerva plays the strategy * , and Severus plays the strategy NOTE: For Albus's and Minerva's strategies, the first noted action refers to their first decision node on the game tree and the second action refers to their action in the second decision node. For example, "S/S" strategy for Albus implies that Albus chooses S in the initial decision node and then S again in their terminal decision node