Consider the following game, which is the job-market signaling game from class, altered so that good workers are more common than bad. Please answer all numbered portions of each question. 2, 1 0, 0 2, -1 0,0 hF ~hF ~hF 2. .... . . . g( ) N 6(1 ) Eb .2... he the hE ~hE 1, 1 -1,0 -1, -1 -3,0 6.6 Consider the separating strategy Es, Fo, where good workers get education and bad workers do not. 1) If anticipating this strategy, what are the employer's beliefs after signals of E and F, respectively (that is, what are p(g| E) and p(g| F))? 2) What overall strategy should the employer choose given those beliefs? 3) Is E,, F, a best reply to this strategy for both worker types