Consider the following normal form game.

Part a: [5 pts]Find all of the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game.

Part b: [5 pts]Are there any mixed strategy Nash equilibria in which player2playsL, M, and R all with strictly positive probability?

Part c: [10 pts]Solve for all of the Nash equilibria (both pure and mixed) of the game (including the ones you might have found in parts a and b).

ic. is It possible for a to Pareto dominate a"? If yes, provide a co in why not. pts] Consider the following normal form game. L M R A 1, 1 3,0 0, 1 B 2.0 0, 1 4,0 C 0,0 2, 0 1, 1 ind all of the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game. re there any mixed strategy Nash equilibria in which player 2 plays positive probability? Solve for all of the Nash equilibria (both pure and mixed) of the ga ght have found in parts a and b). 0 pts] Consider the following extensive form game