Consider the following oligopolistic market. In the first stage, Firm 1 chooses quantity 4]. Firms 2 and 3 observe Firm 'l's choice, and then proceed to simultaneously choose qz and q}, respectively. Market demand is given by p(Q) = 19'0- Q, and Q = 91+ 92+q3. Firm 1's costs are 61(41) = Sal, firm 2's costs are 2102) = 592 and firm 3's costs are 03(9'3) = 593. Starting from the end of the game, you can express Firm 2's best response function in terms of 91 and 95, and you can similarly express Firm 3's best response function in terms of 41 and :12. Using these, answer the following questions. If rounding is needed, write your answers to 3 decimal places. a} (0.5 point) If Firm 1 chooses 41: 9, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? b} {0.5 point) If Firm 1 chooses 41 = 100, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? D c} ('I point} In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 1 produces what quantity? d} {0.5 point) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 2 and firm 3 each produce what quantity