Consider the following passage by Emile Zitzke in 'A Decolonial Critique of Private Law' SAJHR 2018 Vol 34 492-516:

"We have also seen that the fusion of human rights with dominant private law, through an approach called transformative private law, is a weighty response to private-law purism but nevertheless proves to be an inadequate tool for a robust exorcism of racism that holds power over dominant private law. This is true because human rights do not have completely dissimilar epistemic roots to dominant private law. Also, human rights are not understood in the SA context as an imperative to restore African sovereignty by affording African law the standing that it deserves. In the interpretation of human rights in South Africa, we habitually resort to comparative practices that are aimed at making SA law internationally fashionable and palatable to the West. These problems of human rights - specifically as they interact with dominant private law - make them neo-colonial. When we try to dispose of the problems of purism through transformation and its commitment to human rights, we end up with a creolised version of private law that is not the same as a radically critical model."

Do you agree with the above statement and Zitzke's decolonial critique of private law and transformative constitutionalism? Consider Zitzke's claim in light of Dennis Davis' article 'Is the Constitution an obstacle to a democratic post-colonial state' SAJHR 2018 vol 38 359-374.