Consider the following strategic game: (a) Specify the conditions on x,y and z, under which the game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Specify the conditions on x,y and z, under which the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in this case). Compute the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, i.e., specify the randomization probabilities as functions of x,y and z. Consider the following strategic game: (a) Specify the conditions on x,y and z, under which the game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Specify the conditions on x,y and z, under which the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in this case). Compute the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, i.e., specify the randomization probabilities as functions of x,y and z