Consider the following strategic situation. Two friends, Anna s and Bertrand, came into possession two identical copies of the book "The Art of the Squeal," signed by the author(s). Both Anna s and Bertrand consider the book worthless. However, an interested buyer approaches them and offers to buy one copy, and only one copy, from one of them. The buyer sets the following rule: (1) each friend has to simultaneously name an integer price between 0 and 10; (2) the friend who names the lower price sells their copy to the buyer and is paid the price they name and the other one gets nothing; (3) if Anna s and Bertrand name the same price, then the buyer gets suspicious and walks away. (a) Use the notation we had in class to describe what N, {Si}iN, and {ui}iN are. (b) Are there strategies that are strictly dominated? Demonstrate your reasoning. What are the resulting strategies after iterated elimination of dominated strategies? (c) Find the best responses (correspondence) for each player. That is, find the strategies that maximize a player's payoff given what the other player does. (d) Find the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game