Consider the following strategy profile: "All player-types go with probability 1." Select all correct statements about this strategy profile (note you may need to select more than one answer). Question 3

a. This strategy profile is a Bayes Nash equilibrium.

b. "Boring" types have incentive to deviate; this strategy profile is not a Bayes Nash equilibrium.

c. "Fun" types have incentive to deviate; this strategy profile is not a Bayes Nash equilibrium.

Question 4 Consider the following strategy profile: "All player-types stay with probability 1." Select all correct statements about this strategy profile (note you may need to select more than one answer). Question 4Answer

a. This strategy profile is a Bayes Nash equilibrium.

b. "Boring" types have incentive to deviate; this strategy profile is not a Bayes Nash equilibrium.

c. "Fun" types have incentive to deviate; this strategy profile is not a Bayes Nash equilibrium.

Question 5 Consider the following strategy profile: "Fun types go with probability 1, Boring types go with probability 0." Select all correct statements about this strategy profile (note you may need to select more than one answer). Question 5Answer

a. This strategy profile is a Bayes Nash equilibrium.

b. "Boring" types have incentive to deviate; this strategy profile is not a Bayes Nash equilibrium.

c. "Fun" types have incentive to deviate; this strategy profile is not a Bayes Nash equilibrium.

Question 6 Consider the following strategy profile: "Fun types go with probability 0, Boring types go with probability 1." Select all correct statements about this strategy profile (note you may need to select more than one answer). Question 6Answer

a. This strategy profile is a Bayes Nash equilibrium.

b. "Boring" types have incentive to deviate; this strategy profile is not a Bayes Nash equilibrium.

c. "Fun" types have incentive to deviate; this strategy profile is not a Bayes Nash equilibrium.