Consider the following two-player game with players moving sequentially. Player 1 moves first and can choose to either \"Take\" or \"Pass\". If Player 1 chooses \"Take\" then the game ends immediately and Player 1 gets $8 and Player 2 gets $12. If Player 1 chooses \"Pass\" then Player 2 gets to move. Player 2 can choose \"Take\" or \"Pass\". If Player 2 chooses \"Take\" then the game ends immediately. Player 1 gets $10 and Player 2 gets $15. lfPlayer 2 chooses \"Pass\" then Player 1 gets to move again. Player 1 can choose \"Take\" or \"Pass\". In either case the game ends after Player 1's move. IfPlayer 1 chooses \"Take\" then Player 1 gets $20 and Player 2 gets $10. If Player 1 chooses \"Pass\" then Player 1 gets $10 and Player 2 gets $20. (i) What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium ofthis game? (Note: You should draw the game treefor the game. T his will help in answering this question. But you DO NOT need to reproduce the game tree in your answer.)