Consider the following workplace situation. A boss can implement an incentive scheme $($l$)$ or not$($Nl$).$ Following observing this a worker can put in High effort $($H$)$ or low effort $($L$).$ The payoffs are asfollows. Ifl and H are chosen by the boss and worker, respectively, the payoffs are $20$ to the bossand $8$ to the worker. Ifl is chosen by the boss, then L by the worker the payoffs are $12$ to the bossand $5$ to the worker. If the choices are Nl then H$,$ the returns are $23$ and $7$ to the boss and workerrespectively. Finally following Nl and L the payoffs are $16($boss$)$ and $9($worker$)$a$.$ What is the subgame equilibrium of the game? Explain your answer in the context of the principal$-$agent incentive contracts.