Consider the game in Figure 2. (screenshot attached)

(a) (2 points) Find all of the PSNE in this game.

(b) (3 points) Write the MSNE equivalent to the PSNE, above.

(c) (5 points) Find all MSNE of this game.

(d) (5 points) Now, suppose instead of playing against Player 2, Player 1 was playing against a large number of non-strategic people who come in two types. Type 1 always plays X, while Type 2 always plays Y . If the probability of playing against Type 1 is q, what is the expected utility of playing V? W? (i.e. imagine Nature moves first and assigns you to play against Type 1 or Type 2)

(e) (5 points) What value of q sets EU1(V ) = EU1(W )? How is it related to your answer in (c)? Explain.

Just need help in part d) and e)