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. Consider the gure below. The rst payoff is that of player 1, the second that of player 2, the third that of player 3.

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. Consider the gure below. The rst payoff is that of player 1, the second that of player 2, the third that of player 3. (a) Is this a game of perfect or imperfect information? How many subgames does the game have? What are the sets of pure strate gies? (b) Find the set of pure-strategy SPE of the game. (c) Now suppose we split the information set such that player 2 can observe player 1's choice. What is the set of purestrategy SPE? (d) Does player 2 gain from being able to observe player 1's choice? Why /why not? (3,5,5) (2,2,6) (1,6,1) (6,3,3)

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