Consider the sequential battle of the sexes: There are two players: Player 1 and 2 Player 1 moves first, chooses A or B Player 2 sees Player 1 choice, and chooses either A or B If the choices are both A, then Player 1 obtains payoff 3 and Player 2 obtains payoff 1 If the choices are both B, then Player 1 obtains payoff 1 and Player 2 obtains payoff 3 If the choices do not match (one is A and one is B), then both players obtain a payoff of zero Which statement is false for this game? A. Player 2 has four pure strategies B. There is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium C. There are more Nash equilibria than subgame perfect Nash equilibria D. In a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium the payoff of Player 2 is higher than the payoff of Player 1