Consider the two-player strategic form game represented in the following payoff table: 2 M 0,4 0,4 -2, 3 t 1 m b L 1,5 3,2 1,5 R 4, 2 4,3 6, 1 Player 1 chooses between rows, S = {t,m, b}, and receives the first listed payoff in each cell. Player 2 chooses between columns, S = {L, M, R}, and receives the second listed payoff in each cell. a. With reference to the concept of rationalizability, explain why neither strategy b nor R would be played by player 1 and 2, respectively, as part of any equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies. b. By clearly identifying both players' best-response functions, solve for all pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria in this game. Make sure that you explain your solution method carefully.