Consumers traveling from city X to city Z must travel via city Y.The only airline serving the market between X and Y is Ace Air. The only airline serving the market between Y and Z is Bon Air. Both airlines have the same cost functions CA(Q) = 50Q and CB(Q) = 50Q. Each airline sets a price for the segment of the trip that they operate. The number of passengers depends on the total price for the trip from X to Z, i.e. and is P = PA + PB, 550 P if P < 550 Q = D(P) = 0 if P > 550 Both airlines choose their prices simultaneously and have sufficient capacity to serve the full market. {150, 200, 250, 300}, 1. Suppose each airline considers prices 150, 200, 250, or 300 for their segment of the trip. That is, Ace Air's and Bon Air's strategy sets are PA SA = {150, 200, 250, 300} and p SB respectively. = Create the payoff matrix for this game. Does any player (i.e. airline) have any dominated strategies? If so, reduce the game by eliminating all dominated strategies. Find the best responses for both airlines and identify all Nash equilibria. Are any Nash Equilibria Pareto efficient?