Could some one help me to solve those questions? thanks

Use the following statements (#1 - #4) to answer the following question. For a monopolist to practice price discrimination, it must be able to: (1) prove that there are legitimate cost differences that justify different prices. (2) separate buyers into separate classes of consumers. (3) calculate the willingness to pay of each potential purchaser or group. (4) control each group's demand for the product. 0 Both (1) and (2) 0 Both (2) and (3) Q Both (1) and (3) 0 Both (2) and (4) @ Both (3) and (4) A firm is a natural monopoly if it exhibits which of the following as its output increases? decreasing marginal revenue O increasing marginal cost O decreasing average revenue O decreasing average total costWhat is reduced when a monopolist switches from charging a single price to perfect price discrimination (the rst-degree price discrimination)? @ the quantity produced 0 the rm's prot 0 consumer surplus 0 total surplus As a result of using the marginal cost pricing rule to regulate a natural monopoly, O the natural monopoly earns a normal profit. @ the monopolist is allowed to cover all its costs and earn a normal profit. O the monopolist produces an inefficient amount of product. 0 it yields a smaller consumer surplus than does a average cost pricing rule. 0 the natural monopoly will incur a negative profit. \fIt is the case that output levels will be highest when a firm is ________ and lowest when it is O perfectly competitive ; a price-discriminating monopolist perfectly competitive ; a monopolist O a price-discriminating monopolist ; a monopolist O a perfectly price-discriminating monopolist ; an oligopoly 0 an oligopoly ; a perfectly price-discriminating monopolist Consider a market served by a single producer. Suppose that there is no government regulation. On the graph below, what is the profit-maximizing quantity and price for this monopolist? ATC MC O The price is p3 and the quantity is 0 The price is p1 and the quantity is q3 O The price is p3 and the quantity is q3 O The price is p2 and the quantity is q2 O The price is p3 and the quantity is q1 Consider the following games: Adam and Eve want to go out for dinner this Friday at 6 pm to celebrate the end of a great semester. When Friday rolls around, neither of them remember where they agreed to go. Without contacting each other, they independently decide between the two options: Ruth's Chris Steak House or Model Milk. The payoff matrix is shown below, with the left number in each cell referring to Adam's payoff, and the right number referring to Eve's payoff. Find the dominant strategy for each agent (if one exists). Ruth's Chris Model Milk Steak House Ruth's Chris Steak 1,2 House Model Milk Adam's dominant strategy is going to Model Milk and Eve's dominant strategy is going to Ruth's Chris Steak House. 0 Adam's dominant strategy is going to Model Milk and Eve does not have a dominant strategy. 0 Adam's dominant strategy is going to Ruth's Chris Steak House and Eve does not have a dominant strategy. 0 Neither has a dominant strategy. 0 Adam does not have a dominant strategy and Eve's dominant strategy is going to Ruth's Chris Steak House. The prisoners' dilemma is a two-person game that illustrates which of the following? 0 the cooperative outcome could be worse for both people than the Nash equilibrium 0 :ven if the cooperative outcome is better than the Nash equilibrium for one person, it might be worse for the other 6) wen if cooperation is better than the Nash equilibrium, each person might have an incentive not to cooperate O 'ational, self-interested individuals will naturally avoid the Nash equilibrium because it is worse for both of them Agent Mr. James Bond and Agent Mr. Chuck Norris can each choose between two strategies. Each agent makes their choice of strategy at the same time (i.e. they cannot observe the other agent's move before choosing their own move). Each of the following matrices shows the strategies available to each agent and the payoff from each strategy choice. The payoff is shown with payoff to Norris first, then payoff to Bond. Assume a larger number payoff is superior to a smaller number payoff. 0 Find the dominant strategy for each agent (if one exists). Disinformation Infiltration Blond Wig Fake beard O Norris: Blond Wig; Bond: Disinformation O Norris: Blond Wig; Bond: Inltration Norris: Fake beard; Bond: Disinformation O Norris: No dominant strategy; Bond: Inltration A monopolist has cost function TC = 10 + 2Q. Demand in this market is given by the equation Q = 14 P. Suppose the monopolist is able to practice first-degree price discrimination. What is the price for the 4th unit purchased? 10 15 20 30 O The output choice and price level that maximize this monopolist's prots are: 0 Q=10, P=$20 Q=20, P=$20 O Q=15, P=$15 Q Q=10, P=$10 o A monopolist faces demand from two groups of consumers. Demand from class 1 is given by: Q1 =15 -;1'. Demand from class 2 is given by: Q2 = 40 2P. Given this information, _______ has the more elastic demand curve and ______ will pay a higher price under 3rd degree price discrimination. O Class 1; Class 1 0 Class 1; Class 2 (9 Class 2; Class 1 O Class 2; Class 2 Eve is having dinner at a restaurant and she sees Adam enter the restaurant to order take out. Adam also sees Eve. They both choose between talking or not talking. If both choose to talk, then they eat together in the restaurant and both get a payoff of 0. If Adam chooses to talk and Eve chooses to not talk, Adam gets a payoff of -2 and Eve gets a payoff of 1. If Eve chooses to talk and Adam chooses to not talk, Eve gets a payoff of -3 and Adam gets a payoff of 1. If both choose to not talk, they both get a payoff of 4. The payoff matrix for this game is shown below. Find the dominant strategy for each agent (if one exists). Don't Talk O Adam's dominant strategy is don't talk and Eve's dominant strategy is talk O Adam does not have a dominant strategy and Eve's dominant strategy is talk. 0 Neither has a dominant strategy. 0 Adam's dominant strategy is talk and Eve's dominant strategy is don't talk 0 Adam's dominant strategy is talk and Eve does not have a dominant strategy. The price of labor (L) is $2 per unit of labor and the price of capital (K) is $5 per unit of capital. Given this information, complete the table below. After completing the table, fill in the blank questions to define each concept. ~ Labor Capital Output Marginal Variable Fixed Total Average Average (L)- Average Marginal (K)- (Q)- Product of Cost Cost Cost Variable Fixed Total Cost (MC) Labor (VC)- (FC)- (TC)~ Cost Cost Cost (MPI)