Could you please grammatically correct the following. All mistakes need to be highlighted in red and corrections need to be made in yellow highlight next to the wrong word.

1.Waiver of Error, If Anv.

With his first and second issues/points of error, McLemore alleged that the trial court erred by violating the appellant's statutory and commonlaw common law rights of allocution. See Appellant's Brief, pgs. ii, 16. However, McLemore failed to preserve his appellate contentions for review, as

explained below.

It is well-settled that to complain on appeal of the denial of a right to allocution, whether statutory or one claimed under the common law, a defendant must timely object.[1]See Tenon v. State,563 S. W.2d 622, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) ("where there was no objection in the trial court that defendant had been denied the right of allocution, no error was shown . . . ");McClmtickv. State, 508 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (op. on reh'g)).See also Norton v. State, 434 S. W.3d 767, 771 (Tex. AppHouston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Put simply, McLemore failed to preserve error.See id.Accordingly, the appellant's first and second issues/points of error should be overruled.

1.The Complained-of-Error Complained-of Error Was Harmless.

Even if any error had been preserved as to the statutory- and commonlaw rights ofallocution, the alleged denial was harmless. See Tex. R. App. P. 44. 2(a)-(b). On appeal, McLemore did not indicate that he wished to inform the trial court that he had been pardoned, was incompetent, or had been misidentified following an escape. SeeTex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.42.07. (West 2014). Also, McLemore did not indicate what additional mitigating evidence he would have raised, if given the opportunity to address the trial court. Therefore, the complained of error did not contribute to the assessment of punishment.SeeTex. R. App. P. 44. 2(a)-(b). Thus, the appellant's first and second issues/points of error should be overruled.

ISSUES/POINTS OF ERROR IN REPLY NOS. 3 AND 4: THE APPELLANT'S CURRENT COMPLAINT ON APPEAL DID NOT COMFORT WITH ANY TIMELY OBJECTION OR MOTION IN THE TRIAL COURT; BUT EVEN ASSUMING PRESERVATION OF ERROR, THE WITNESS (OFFICER LUTES) DID NOT COMMIT PERJURY; AND THE TRIAL COURT IMPLICITLY CONCLUDED THAT THE STATE HAD NOT SUBORNED PERJURY.

1.McLemore's Appellate Complaint Did Not Comport With Any Trial Objection, And Was Not Preserved for Review.

With his third issue/point of error, McLemore complained that his conviction was secured through the use of perjured testimony that was material to the State's case.SeeAppellant's Brief, pgs. 24-34. However, the appellant's current complaint did not comport with any trial objection, and was not preserved for review.See Dooly v. State, 65 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Tex. AppDallas 2002, no pet.) (citingTex. R. App. P.33. 1(a)(l)). Although McLemore filed a motion for new trial, the appellant's current complaint was not raised in that motion. See Tex. R.

App. P. 33. 1(a);State v. Gonzales, 855 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (accused is required to allege sufficient grounds to appraise the trial judge and the State as to why he believes himself entitled to a new trial). Because McLemore's appellate complaint did not comport with (a) any timely and/or specific objection at trial or (b) any specifically-sufficient ground(s) in his motion for new trial, the appellant's third and fourth issues/points of error should be overruled.See id; Dooley, 65 S. W.3d at 842.

1.Even Assumins Preservation of Error, Officer Lutes Did Not Commit Periurv.

A witness does not commit perjury by testifying falsely because of a reasonable mistake, such as faulty memory." See, e.g.,Marchbanks v. State,341 S. W.3d 559, 563 n. 3 (Tex. App-Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (citingTex. Penal Code Ann. 37. 02 (West 2011);De La Paz v.State, 279 S. W.Sd 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (if the jury concludes that a defendant honestly, though mistakenly, thought that his statement was tme when he made it, then the jury could not find that he "intended to deceive. "))."Perjury is committed by making a deliberate and willful false statement under oath."Oath." SeeFarrakhan v. States, 263 S. W.3d 124, 131 (Tex. App. -Houston [1 st 1st Dist.] 2006),aff'd, 247 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). "The branding of any person with a charge of perjury should not be taken lightly."See Farrakhan, 263 S. W.3d at 132 (citing In re Davila, 631 S. W.2d 723, 728 (Tex. 1982)). As applied here, even assuming the appellant's preservation of any error, officer Lutes testified during cross-examination to the following:

1.So why did you testify in a previous hearing that it was unreasonable?

2.Either that I misspoke or I misunderstood the question at that time, sir

3.Well, you went on to clarify that. So your 19 testimony today is that it's reasonable, but you previously testified, under oath, that it was unreasonable?

4.Yes, sir.

5.So is it just, whatever happens, however it flows, then that's how it works for you?

6.No, sir.

7.Because you went on to say - do you think it makes sense, do you think it makes sense that he's secreting it?

8.Do I think it makes sense that Mr. McLemore's secretmg it?

9.Yes.

10. Yes, sir

11. What was your testimony in March of - March of 2015?

12. Sir, that was over a year ago. I can't recall my testimony.

13. LACY: May I approach?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

1.(By Mr. Lacy) Answer: I wouldn't say that's reasonable, sir. That's his judgment call.

Question: Well, it makes sense, doesn't it? Answer, Mr. Lutes.

1.The answer is; No, sir, I deal with narcotics on a daily basis.

2.And your testimony today is, now it does make sense, but your testimony in March, 11 months after these events, ten months after these events, was that it didn't make sense.

3.It makes sense that individuals try and secrete narcotics. That's what I was trying to make that point.

4.Your testimony was specifically that Mr. McLemore secreting - secreting it would not make sense, that was your sworn testimony in a court of law.

5.I must have misunderstood the question at that time, sir. It's common for individuals to secrete narcotics on a regular basis.

SeeRR, Vol. 3, pgs. 34-35

By testifying on two separate occasions that he misunderstood, or must have misunderstood, "the question at that times " officer Lutes provided the basis for a reasonable mistake, such as faulty memory.See Marchblanks, 341 S. W.3d at 563 n. 3. Specifically, officer

Lutes testified: "Sir, that was over a year ago. I can't recall my testimony." That testimony provided a reasonable mistake.

Given these circumstances, the trial court could have implicitly concluded that officer Lutes did not commit perjury. See Farrakhan, 263 S. W.Sd at 132. If the trial court concluded that no perjury had occurred, then it did not err in implicitly concluding that the State had not suborned perjury. Thus, the third and fourth issues/points of error should be overruled.

[1]See Christian Gallegos-Perez v. The State of Texas, No. 05-16-00015-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11836, at * 5 (Tex. App- Dallas November 1, 2016, n. p. h.) (mem. op., not1.Waiver of Error, If Anv.

With his first and second issues/points of error, McLemore alleged that the trial court erred by violating the appellant's statutory and commonlaw common law rights of allocution. See Appellant's Brief, pgs. ii, 16. However, McLemore failed to preserve his appellate contentions for review, as

explained below.

It is well-settled that to complain on appeal of the denial of a right to allocution, whether statutory or one claimed under the common law, a defendant must timely object.[1]See Tenon v. State,563 S. W.2d 622, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) ("where there was no objection in the trial court that defendant had been denied the right of allocution, no error was shown . . . ");McClmtickv. State, 508 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (op. on reh'g)).See also Norton v. State, 434 S. W.3d 767, 771 (Tex. AppHouston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Put simply, McLemore failed to preserve error.See id.Accordingly, the appellant's first and second issues/points of error should be overruled.

1.The Complained-of-Error Complained-of Error Was Harmless.

Even if any error had been preserved as to the statutory- and commonlaw rights ofallocution, the alleged denial was harmless. See Tex. R. App. P. 44. 2(a)-(b). On appeal, McLemore did not indicate that he wished to inform the trial court that he had been pardoned, was incompetent, or had been misidentified following an escape. SeeTex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.42.07. (West 2014). Also, McLemore did not indicate what additional mitigating evidence he would have raised, if given the opportunity to address the trial court. Therefore, the complained of error did not contribute to the assessment of punishment.SeeTex. R. App. P. 44. 2(a)-(b). Thus, the appellant's first and second issues/points of error should be overruled.

ISSUES/POINTS OF ERROR IN REPLY NOS. 3 AND 4: THE APPELLANT'S CURRENT COMPLAINT ON APPEAL DID NOT COMFORT WITH ANY TIMELY OBJECTION OR MOTION IN THE TRIAL COURT; BUT EVEN ASSUMING PRESERVATION OF ERROR, THE WITNESS (OFFICER LUTES) DID NOT COMMIT PERJURY; AND THE TRIAL COURT IMPLICITLY CONCLUDED THAT THE STATE HAD NOT SUBORNED PERJURY.

1.McLemore's Appellate Complaint Did Not Comport With Any Trial Objection, And Was Not Preserved for Review.

With his third issue/point of error, McLemore complained that his conviction was secured through the use of perjured testimony that was material to the State's case.SeeAppellant's Brief, pgs. 24-34. However, the appellant's current complaint did not comport with any trial objection, and was not preserved for review.See Dooly v. State, 65 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Tex. AppDallas 2002, no pet.) (citingTex. R. App. P.33. 1(a)(l)). Although McLemore filed a motion for new trial, the appellant's current complaint was not raised in that motion. See Tex. R.

App. P. 33. 1(a);State v. Gonzales, 855 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (accused is required to allege sufficient grounds to appraise the trial judge and the State as to why he believes himself entitled to a new trial). Because McLemore's appellate complaint did not comport with (a) any timely and/or specific objection at trial or (b) any specifically-sufficient ground(s) in his motion for new trial, the appellant's third and fourth issues/points of error should be overruled.See id; Dooley, 65 S. W.3d at 842.

1.Even Assumins Preservation of Error, Officer Lutes Did Not Commit Periurv.

A witness does not commit perjury by testifying falsely because of a reasonable mistake, such as faulty memory." See, e.g.,Marchbanks v. State,341 S. W.3d 559, 563 n. 3 (Tex. App-Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (citingTex. Penal Code Ann. 37. 02 (West 2011);De La Paz v.State, 279 S. W.Sd 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (if the jury concludes that a defendant honestly, though mistakenly, thought that his statement was tme when he made it, then the jury could not find that he "intended to deceive. "))."Perjury is committed by making a deliberate and willful false statement under oath."Oath." SeeFarrakhan v. States, 263 S. W.3d 124, 131 (Tex. App. -Houston [1 st 1st Dist.] 2006),aff'd, 247 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). "The branding of any person with a charge of perjury should not be taken lightly."See Farrakhan, 263 S. W.3d at 132 (citing In re Davila, 631 S. W.2d 723, 728 (Tex. 1982)). As applied here, even assuming the appellant's preservation of any error, officer Lutes testified during cross-examination to the following:

1.So why did you testify in a previous hearing that it was unreasonable?

2.Either that I misspoke or I misunderstood the question at that time, sir

3.Well, you went on to clarify that. So your 19 testimony today is that it's reasonable, but you previously testified, under oath, that it was unreasonable?

4.Yes, sir.

5.So is it just, whatever happens, however it flows, then that's how it works for you?

6.No, sir.

7.Because you went on to say - do you think it makes sense, do you think it makes sense that he's secreting it?

8.Do I think it makes sense that Mr. McLemore's secretmg it?

9.Yes.

10. Yes, sir

11. What was your testimony in March of - March of 2015?

12. Sir, that was over a year ago. I can't recall my testimony.

13. LACY: May I approach?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

1.(By Mr. Lacy) Answer: I wouldn't say that's reasonable, sir. That's his judgment call.

Question: Well, it makes sense, doesn't it? Answer, Mr. Lutes.

1.The answer is; No, sir, I deal with narcotics on a daily basis.

2.And your testimony today is, now it does make sense, but your testimony in March, 11 months after these events, ten months after these events, was that it didn't make sense.

3.It makes sense that individuals try and secrete narcotics. That's what I was trying to make that point.

4.Your testimony was specifically that Mr. McLemore secreting - secreting it would not make sense, that was your sworn testimony in a court of law.

5.I must have misunderstood the question at that time, sir. It's common for individuals to secrete narcotics on a regular basis.

SeeRR, Vol. 3, pgs. 34-35

By testifying on two separate occasions that he misunderstood, or must have misunderstood, "the question at that times " officer Lutes provided the basis for a reasonable mistake, such as faulty memory.See Marchblanks, 341 S. W.3d at 563 n. 3. Specifically, officer

Lutes testified: "Sir, that was over a year ago. I can't recall my testimony." That testimony provided a reasonable mistake.

Given these circumstances, the trial court could have implicitly concluded that officer Lutes did not commit perjury. See Farrakhan, 263 S. W.Sd at 132. If the trial court concluded that no perjury had occurred, then it did not err in implicitly concluding that the State had not suborned perjury. Thus, the third and fourth issues/points of error should be overruled.

[1]See Christian Gallegos-Perez v. The State of Texas, No. 05-16-00015-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11836, at * 5 (Tex. App- Dallas November 1, 2016, n. p. h.) (mem. op., not