(Cournot's Model of Duopoly) Joe and Rebecca are small-town ready-mix concrete duopolists. The market demand function is Q = 5500 - 25P, where P is the price of a cubic metre of concrete and Q is the number of cubic metres demanded every year. Marginal cost is $40 per cubic metre. Competition in this market is described by the Cournot model. Please do9. Now suppose the marginal costs of Joe and Rebecca are 40 and 44, respectively. What is the Nash Equilibrium of the Cournot model now? ifidentia do not distr istr b. Now suppose there are 3 producers in the market: Joe, Rebecca and Roy. All 3 producers have the same constant marginal cost $40 per Please cubic metre. The market demand function is the same as before. ial Now what is the Nash equilibrium of the new Cournot game? lease