David A. Sifuentes v. Dropbox, Inc.

Case 4:20-cv-07908-HSG Document 57 Filed 06/29/22 Page 3 of 8 Case 4:20-cv-07908-HSG Document 57 Filed 06/29/22 Page 4 of 8 III. DISCUSSION substantially the same mandatory arbitration provision. Reply at 9. The September 24, 2019 . Alleged Arbitration Agreement N terms of service, which were in effect when Plaintiff filed his Complaint, contain the following Defendant contends that Plaintiff assented to terms of service ("TOS") that require w w arbitration provision: arbitration. Defendant represents that, according to its records, Plaintiff signed up for Dropbox on A We Both Agree to Arbitrate. You and Dropbox agree to resolve any December 15, 2011. Dkt. No. 40-1 Decl. of Wendy Weber | 10 ("Weber Decl."). Defendant 5 claims relating to these Terms or the Services through final and binding arbitration by a single arbitrator, except as set forth under explains that when Plaintiff created his Dropbox account, he would have been "required to Exceptions to Agreement to Arbitrate below. This includes disputes 6 arising out of or relating to interpretation or application of this affirmatively check a box stating 'I agree to Dropbox Terms of Service' to affirmatively indicate "Mandatory Arbitration Provisions" section, including enforceability, revocability, or validity. [his] agreement to the Dropbox TOS and further press a button stating 'Create account."" See id. Dkt. No. 40-1 Exhibit P; see also Mot. at 9. The September 24, 2019 TOS includes a 6. According to Defendant, the "TOS were visibly hyperlinked and set off by blue font color." provision for opting out of arbitration: and the hyperlink would have taken Plaintiff to the July 6, 2011 TOS. Id.; see Dkt. No. 40-1 10 10 Opt-out of Agreement to Arbitration. You can decline this agreement Exhibit E. Defendant asserts that if Plaintiff did not click the checkbox and sign-up button, the to arbitrate by clicking here and submitting the opt-out form within 11 30 days of first registering your account. However, if you agreed to registration process would have ended and he would not have been able to use Dropbox's a previous version of these Terms that allowed you to opt out of 12 12 arbitration, your previous choice to opt out or not opt out remains platform. Weber Decl. P 6. binding. 13 Defendant maintains that Plaintiff has continuously had a Dropbox account since he signed Dkt. No. 40-1 Exhibit P. It also includes a list of exceptions to the agreement to arbitrate, 14 up on December 15, 2011. Id. | 10. Defendant represents that it has modified its terms of service such as when a party brings a lawsuit solely for injunctionrelief, that do not apply here. See id. Northern District of California United States District Court 15 United States District Court Northern District of California 15 twelve times since 2011. Id. " 11-21; Mot. at 9. Defendant's position is that Plaintiff assented to Plaintiff does not contest Defendant's representations about the design and content of the 16 16 each of these modifications by continuing to use the Dropbox service. Reply at 9. In a March 24, website or the Terms of Service. See generally Opp. Plaintiff also does not contest that he agreed 17 2014 modification, Dropbox added an arbitration provision to its terms of service. Mot. at 8. to the July 6, 2011 TOS. See Opp. at 1-2. However, Plaintiff argues that the July 6, 2011 TOS 18 18 Dropbox asserts that it notified users, including Plaintiff, of this change in an email, with does not contain an arbitration provision, and that he never agreed to any later terms of service. 19 19 hyperlinks leading to the new terms of service and Defendant's blog, as indicated by differently See id. at 1. Plaintiff contends that he "never read, clicked on[, or] accepted any updated terms 20 20 colored text. See Reply at 6; Dkt. No. 53 Exhibit A. The email also included multiple bullet and condition [sic] including any emails sent concerning any changes to the (TOS)'s and the 21 21 points describing changes being made to the TOS, including: arbitration agreement." Id. 22 22 B. Validity of Arbitration Agreement 23 We're adding an arbitration section to our updated Terms of Service. 23 Arbitration is a quick and efficient way to resolve disputes, and it When the parties contest whether an agreement was formed, the party seeking to compel 24 provides an alternative to things like state or federal courts where the 24 process could take months or even years. If you don't want to agree arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of the agreement by a preponderance of the 25 to arbitration, you can easily opt-out via an online form, within 30- 25 days of these Terms becoming effective. This form, and other details, evidence. See Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017). 26 are available on our blog. 26 Conversely, the party opposing arbitration is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable doubts and 27 Dkt. No. 40-1 Exhibit B 27 28 ant further contends that all terms of service since March 24, 2014 have included 28 2 The words "clicking here" appear to be a hyperlink.Case 4:20-cv-07908-HSG Document 57 Filed 06/29/22 Page 1 of 8 Case 4:20-cv-07908-HSG Document 57 Filed 06/29/22 Page 2 of 8 On the basis of these facts, Plaintiff brings multiple causes of action, including claims for invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional W N distress, and conversion in addition to violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Fair and UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, California Civil Code section 1798.29, and Michigan NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Law section 445.72. Id. at 1. Plaintiff seeks $550,000 in damages. Id. at 3. LEGAL STANDARD DAVID ANGEL SIFUENTES, Case No. 20-cv-07908-HSG The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. $$ 1 er seq., sets forth a policy favoring Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO arbitration agreements and establishes that a written arbitration agreement is "valid, irrevocable. COMPEL ARBITRATION and enforceable." 9 U.S.C. $ 2; Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018) (noting Re: Dkt. No. 40 DROPBOX, INC., 10 federal policy favoring arbitration); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constrcorp., 460 11 Defendant. 1 1 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (same). The FAA allows that a party "aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, 12 or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United Pending before the Court is Defendant Dropbox, Inc.'s motion to compel arbitration, 13 States district court . . . for an order directing that . . . arbitration proceed in the manner provided briefing for which is complete. See Dkt. Nos. 40 ("Mot."), 42 ("Opp."), 47 ("Reply").' The Court 14 for in such agreement." 9 U.S.C. $ 4. This federal policy is "simply to ensure the enforceability, heard oral argument on the motion on January 20, 2022. See Dkt. No. 54. For the reasons Northern District of California United States District Court Northern District of California United States District Court 15 according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate." Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of detailed below, the Court DENIES the motion. 16 Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989). Courts must resolve any 1. BACKGROUND 17 "ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself . . . in favor of arbitration." Id. Pro Se Plaintiff David Angel Sifuentes III filed this action against Defendant on November 18 When a party moves to compel arbitration, the court must determine (1) "whether a valid 19 9, 2020. Dkt. No. 1. He then filed an amended complaint on January 21, 2021. Dkt. No. 10 19 arbitration agreement exists" and (2) "whether the agreement e compasses the dispute at issue." 20 ("Am. Comp."). Plaintiff alleges that his Dropbox account was compromised in a 2012 data 20 Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc., 363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004). The 21 breach, which put his personal information at risk. /d. at 2. Plaintiff further alleges that Dropbox 21 agreement may also delegate gateway issues to an arbitrator, in which case the court's role is 22 failed to inform him of the breach, and that his personal information has been stolen and used by 22 limited to determining whether there is clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to 23 "hackers and cyber criminals." /d. Plaintiff asserts that as a result of the data breach his bank 23 arbitrate arbitrability. See Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2015). In either 24 account has been made vulnerable, he has to frequently change his log-in information for various 24 instance, "before referring a dispute to an arbitrator, the court determines whether a valid 25 accounts, and he worries that his personal information could be used to commit crimes. Id. at 2-3. 25 arbitration agreement exists." Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 26 26 530 (2019) (citing 9 U.S.C. $ 2). 27 Defendant also submitted a color copy of Exhibit B to the Declaration of Wendy Weber in support of Defendant's motion to compel arbitration. Dkt. No. 53. Plaintiff filed an additional, 27 28 unsolicited opposition on February 8, 2022, Dkt. No. $5, but the Court finds that those arguments 28 do not change the outcome of the motion. AUTHENTIC ATED GPOCase 4:20-cv-07908-HSG Document 57 Filed 06/29/22 Page 5 of 8 Case 4:20-cv-07908-HSG Document 57 Filed 06/29/22 Page 6 of 8 - inferences. See Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1141 (9th 2011 TOS at the time he created a Dropbox account, see Opp. at 1-2, and the Court finds that there N Cir. 1991). Therefore, a court may find that an agreement to arbitrate exists as a matter of law 2 was a mutual manifestation of assent to the 2011 TOS. Importantly, however, the 2011 TOS did W "[o]nly when there is no genuine issue of fact concerning the formation of the agreement." Id. 3 not have a mandatory arbitration provision. (citation and quotation omitted). 4 ii. Defendants fail to show that Plaintiff had notice of the later terms of service. In determining whether an agreement was formed, the Court applies "general state-law Plaintiff denies that he agreed to the later terms of service that added mandatory arbitration principles of contract interpretation," without a presumption in favor of arbitrability. See 6 provisions. Opp. at 1. Defendant, on the other hand, contends that Plaintiff assented to the Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). subsequent versions by continuing to use Defendant's service. Dkt. No. 47 at 7; see also Dkt. No. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that while the rise of internet-based commerce "has exposed 40 at 9 n.2. Assent by continued use of a web service is a traditional feature of browsewrap courts to many new situations, it has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract." agreements. Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1176 ("The defining feature of browsewrap agreements is that 10 Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014). One of those principles is 10 the user can continue to use the website or its services without visiting the page hosting the that in order for a contract to be formed there must be mutual manifestation of assent. Id. 1 1 browsewrap agreement or even knowing that such a webpage exists.") (citation omitted). "Courts 12 Courts generally evaluate online contracts as falling into one of two categories: 12 are more reluctant to enforce browsewrap agreements because consumers are frequently left 13 (1) "clickwrap" agreements where a user is presented with the terms and conditions and must click 13 unaware that contractual terms were even offered, much less that continued use of the website will 14 on a button or box to indicate that he agrees before he may continue, which courts generally 14 be deemed to manifest acceptance of those terms." Berman v. Freedom Financial Network, LLC, United States District Court 15 enforce; and (2) "browsewrap" agreements where the website's terms and conditions are provided Northern District of California Northern District of California United States District Court 15 30 F.4th 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2022). to users via a hyperlink at the bottom of a webpage and a user's assent to the terms is assumed by 16 The validity of an online agreement depends on whether the user had actual or constructive his continued use of the website, which courts often view with skepticism. See id. at 1175-77. 17 notice of the website's terms. See Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177. "Unless the website operator can 18 Online contracts can also be some blend of the two. Id. at 1176-77. Regardless, "the onus [is] on 18 show that a consumer has actual knowledge of the agreement, an enforceable contract will be 19 website owners to put users on notice of the terms to which they wish to bind consumers." Id. at 19 found based on an inquiry notice theory only if: (1) the website provides reasonably conspicuous 20 1179 20 notice of the terms to which the consumer will be bound; and (2) the consumer takes some action, 21 Plaintiff assented to the 2011 TOS. 21 such as clicking a button or checking a box, that unambiguously manifests his or her assent to 22 Plaintiff's assent to the January 6, 2011 TOS falls on the "clickwrap" end of the spectrum. 22 those terms." Berman, 30 F.4th at 856. 23 He clicked a box stating. "I agree to Dropbox Terms of Service", and the July 6, 201 1 TOS was 23 Here, Plaintiff denies that he ever agreed to arbitrate, read any updated terms of service, or 24 hyperlinked next to that checkbox. See Weber Decl. | 6, Exhibit A. Plaintiff had clear notice, 24 opened any emails from Defendant about these issues. Opp. at 2-3. Defendant explains that it had 25 and took physical action to manifest his assent. Plaintiff does not contest that he agreed to the 25 a policy of mass emailing its many subscribers about updated terms of service, see Dkt. No. 40-1 1 26 26 7, but there is nothing in the record to suggest that Plaintiff saw or read the email, such as a read 27 3 Here, all relevant versions of the TOS contain a California choice-of-law provision, including the 27 28 July 6, 2011 TOS. 28 OneDrive Screenshot sa TheCase 4:20-cv-07908-HSG Document 57 Filed 06/29/22 Page 7 of 8 Case 4:20-cv-07908-HSG Document 57 Filed 06/29/22 Page 8 of 8 receipt reflecting that Plaintiff opened the email. The Court finds that Defendant has not shown E. But Ninth Circuit law is clear that it is a website owner's duty to show clear notice and assent. N by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff had actual notice of the updated terms of service. The Court finds that Defendant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that w See Norcia, LLC, 845 F.3d at 1283. w Plaintiff had actual or inquiry notice of the updated terms of service. See Norcia, LLC, 845 F.3d To show that Plaintiff had inquiry notice, Defendant must show that he was provided at 1283. Without actual or inquiry notice, there was no manifestation of mutual assent, and the reasonably conspicuous notice of the contract terms and unambiguously manifested his assent. 5 later terms of service do not impose an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. See Berman, 30 F.4th at 856 . "[O]nline providers have complete control over the design of their 6 IV. CONCLUSION websites," and therefore have the responsibility to put users on notice of the terms to which they The Court DENIES Defendant's motion to compel arbitration. The Court further SETS wish to bind consumers. Id. at 857 (citations omitted). Defendant acknowledges that between an initial telephonic case management conference for July 19, 2022 at 2:00 p.m and DIRECTS 2011 and 2019 it modified its terms of service no less than twelve times, and contends that it sent the parties to submit a joint case management statement by July 12, 2022. All parties and counsel 10 an email to Plaintiff in 2014 explaining the addition of a mandatory arbitration clause. Reply at 9. 10 shall use the following dial-in information to access the call: 11 There is nothing in the record to suggest that Plaintiff could not use the service until he indicated 11 Dial-In: 888-808-6929; his assent, that he would have been advised of new terms and conditions while using Defendant's 12 Passcode: 6064255 services, or that Defendant ever tracked whether Plaintiff had opened its email. Even if the email 13 For call clarity, parties shall NOT use speaker phone or earpieces for these calls, and where alone could be considered "reasonably conspicuous notice," Plaintiff took no action to 14 at all possible, parties shall use landlines. Northern District of California unambiguously manifest his assent. See Berman, 30 F.4th at 856 (requiring the consumer to Northern District of California United States District Court United States District Court 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. "take[ ] some action, such as clicking a button or checking a box" in order to form an enforceable 16 Dated: 6/29/2022 contract under inquiry notice theory). 17 Haywood & billis. 18 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. Defendant essentially argues that it contracted for the right to change the terms at will United States District Judge because the 2011 TOS contains a provision stating that Defendant "may revise these Terms from 19 20 time to time" and that continuing to use the service constitutes agreement to any revised terms. 20 21 See Reply at 6; Dkt. No. 40-1 Exhibit E. Defendant's argument misses the point. Given the 21 complete lack of evidence of notice within Defendant's service itself, Plaintiff's ongoing use of 22 23 the service is irrelevant to determining whether he had actual or constructive notice of the post- 23 24 2011 terms of service. Moreover, the 2011 TOS essentially disavows any obligation to alert 24 25 Plaintiff to changes: "If a revision, in our sole discretion, is material we will notify you (for 25 26 example via email to the email address associated with your account." See Dkt. No. 40-1 Exhibit 26 27 27 28 28 4 Defendant also presented no evidence showing an email sent specifically to Plaintiff. 00