Deal v Bowman

286 Kan. 188 P.3d 941 (2008)

Tort Law for Paralegals 6 ed Neal Bevans

1. Summarize the facts of the case.
2. Who was the Plaintiff in this case? Who was the defendant"
3. What was the cause of action the plaintiff assert in his Complaint?
4. How did the trial court decide this case? Why?
5. How did the appeals court rule on the case? Why?"
6. What did the appeals court state that plaintiff was required to do to prevail in this case? What precedent did the appeals cite to support its statement?
7. On what precedent did the trial court rely to support its finding that there was a fact question as to whether Bowman acted negligently?
8. What were the facts of the case on which the trial court relied?
9. Why did the trial court rely on the case it did in deciding how to rule on the Deal case.?
10. How many appeals were taken in this case? What was the final decision in the case?

DEAL V. BOWMAN 286 Kan. 853, 188 P.3d 941 (2008) The opinion of the court was delivered by Street, approached the intersection of Main and DAVIS, J. Adams. The traffic traveling on Main Street This is a personal injury action arising from was not required to stop at this intersection, a collision at a controlled intersection. Trial but vehicles on Adams Street had stop signs. evidence indicated that the defendant stopped After stopping and looking both directions, at the stop sign and looked both directions Bowman pulled into the intersection, where he before entering the intersection but never- collided with Deal's vehicle, injuring Deal. theless collided with the plaintiff's car, which Deal filed a negligence action against he did not see due to glare from the sun. In Bowman. Both parties agreed that Deal bore no the district court, the jury found no faulteg- fault for the accident. The questions to be deter ligence by either party for the accident. The mined at trial were whether Bowman was at fault Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that and, if so, what damages should be awarded. defendant was ne Because Deal had no recollection of the Deal v. Bowman, No. 96,868, 167 P.3d 387, accident due to his injuries, Bowman provided 2007 WI 2768037, unpublished opinion filed the only testimony as to how the accident hap- September 21, 2007. We granted the defen- pened. Bowman testified that he came to a dant's petition for review, reverse the Court of complete stop at the stop sign and looke Appeals, and affirm the district court. directions. He then pulled into the intersection and collided with Deal's vehicle, injuring Deal. Underlying Facts and Jury Trial see Deal's car On September 17, 2002, Bradley Deal was trav- because the sun hindered his vision when he cling eastbound on Main Street in Council looked west. On direct examination, the fol- Grove at approximately 5:50 P.M. Alan lowing exchange took place between Bowman Bowman, who was traveling south on Adams and his attorney: 126 Chapter 4 Into "Q. And what-tell the jury what hap- explanation, the officer noticed that "the sun pened when you looked to the west? was very blinding that day." con "A. When I looked to the west, I did not At the close of evidence, Deal moved for ity wist see any vehicles at all. There was a pretty good a directed verdict-i.e., for judgment as a con glare from the sun that day, but I did not see matter of law, on the issue of Bowman's neg- any vehicles. ligence/liability. The district court denied his "Q. Officer Furman wrote that vehicle motion, concluding that there was evidence fer a. two, which was you, stopped at the stop sign ad carefully impa unex and looked to the west, and he did not see looked both directions and that the only rea- vehicle one, the plaintiff, due to the sun blind- son he did not see Deal was due to the sun. The BowI .. . th ing him, so he pulled out. Is that what you told case was given to the jury, which found that he m the officer? neither party was at fault for the accident. as a mr "A. Yes. Deal moved for a new trial on the issue of 'Q. Is that what you're telling us today? negligence/liability, arguing that the evidence "A. Yes. conclusively indicated that Bowman had been ing th he inc "Q. When you pulled out, you were aware negligent. The court denied the motion, relying drivers that it was your obligation to look, to be care- primarily on Diaz v. Duke, 206 Kan. 650, 652, "perfec ful? 482 P.2d 48 (1971), where this court reversed Appeal "A. Yes. a directed verdict on the issue of liability in a that of Q. And were you trying to do that? negligence action when "it could have found "A. Yes." found t that on account of being suddenly blinded by demon the sun, the driver did not negligently operate under th Deal's counsel conducted the following his automobile." claiming discussion with Bowman during cross- correct examination: Court of Appeals Decision "was ne Deal appealed the district court's denial of both "Q. Well, you said that your vision was his motions. A divided panel of the Court of motori blindly c blocked to the west. At what point in time was Appeals reversed in an unpublished opinion. it blocked to the west? Although the majority recognized that deter intersecti ing what "A. I wouldn't necessarily say it was minations of negligence are normally left to blocked, but I would say it was hindered by the the trier of fact, the court held that Bowman's. Discussio sun. actions in this case constituted negligence The quest "Q. Okay. And you knew it was hindered? as a matter of law. The court therefore held action of "A. Yes. that the district court erred whe "Q. And you pulled out anyway? Deal's motion for judgment as a matter of law stopping.' dered by tl "A. I very cautiously looked, then pulled out." reversed the district court, and remanded the stitutes ne case for a determination question is Police Officer Tom Furman, who arrived The majority reasoned that "Kansas court there were at the scene of the accident shortly after it have long recognized the general rule that jury could occurred and filed the police report on the ty to stop ! ordinary ca incident, also testified. According to Furman, vehicle within the distance objects can be se For reason Bowman told the officer immediately after the ahead." Recognizing the "blinding light rule court, like t accident occurred that "he stopped at the stop in Diaz, the majority explained that there is Bowman's t sign and he looked, and due to the sun blind- distinction in Kansas case law between fit tion concer ing him . . . he did not see the vehicle coming." that involve a "sudden, unexpected, or sur actions and Furman also testified that when he looked tions and situation submit the q "to the west" after Bowman had provided his as in the present case that involve "a consie the jury. Introduction to Negligence 129 sun condition which diminishes a motorist's abil- Analysis ity to see." The majority found that other- In a personal injury action based upon negli- for wise-negligent acts are not excused where gence, the plaintiff must prove "the existence conditions are constant. of a duty, breach of that duty, injury, and a leg- Because "reasonable minds could not dif- causal connection between the duty breached fer as to the conclusion that the sunlight which and the injury suffered." Nero v. Kansas State nce impaired Bowman's vision was not a sudden, University, 253 Kan. 567, Syl. g 1, 861 P.2d 768 unexpected, or surprising condition . . . or that (1993). The general rule is that "whether a duty Bowman drove into the intersection knowing exists is a question of law," while the question that his vision was impaired by the sun," as to "whether the duty has been breached is the majority held that Bowman was negligent a question of fact." 253 Kan. 567, Syl. g 1, 861 as a matter of law. P.2d 768. Bowman filed a petition for review, claim- "The policy of the law has relegated the ing that the Court of Appeals opinion applied determination of this reasonably careful per- the incorrect legal standard, as the law requires son standard to the jury, to note the special drivers to exercise ordinary care, not to be circumstances of each particular case and then "perfect." Bowman argued that the Court of say whether the conduct is such as would be Appeals majority substituted its opinion for expected of a reasonably careful person under that of the trial court and jury, both of which a similar state of affairs. Only when the facts found that there was evidence in the record are such that reasonable men must draw the demonstrating that Bowman acted reasonably same conclusion from them does the question under the circumstances. Deal filed a response, of negligence become one of law for the court." claiming that the Court of Appeals majority There is no dispute that Bowman's action correctly found that the blinding light rule of driving into the intersection proximately was never intended to provide the basis for caused Deal's injuries. Moreover, it is estab- a motorist to use the sun as a legal excuse to lished that Deal was not at fault. The only blindly continue driving or to enter into an question we must resolve is whether there was intersection, road, or highway without know- evidence in the record raising a factual ques- ing what was in his path." tion as to Bowman's negligence-or, more specifically, whether reasonable minds could Discussion differ as to whether Bowman breached a duty The question before us is whether Bowman's of care when he pulled his vehicle into the ction of pulling into the intersection, after intersection at the time of the accident. stopping, while aware that his vision was hin- Bowman testified at trial that he came to a dered by the glare from ern sun con- complete stop at the stop sign at the intersec- stitutes negligence as a matter of law. This tion of Adams and Main, looked both direc- question is resolved by considering whether tions, and-perceiving that the intersection there were facts in the record from which a was clear-entered the intersection. Bowman jury could determine that Bowman exercised explained that there was "a pretty good glare ordinary care when entering the intersection. from the sun" when he looked west, but he For reasons set forth in this opinion, this "did not see any vehicles." Bowman further court, like the district court, concludes that testified that he was "aware that it was his obli- Bowman's testimony raised a factual ques- gation to look for other vehicles in the inter- tion concerning the reasonableness of his section, to be careful," and that he was "trying actions and thus agrees with the decision to to do that." submit the question of negligence/liability to The district court held that the evidence the jury. established a question of fact as to whether 130 Chapter 4 Intro Bowman acted negligently, relying primar negligence/liability and discussed at length ily on this court's decision in Diaz, 206 Kan. why the blinding light rule in Diaz should 650, 482 P.2d 48. Deal argues-and the Court not apply to the present facts. The majority corre of Appeals majority agreed-that it was inher- found that the holding in Diaz was premised ment that )130 Chapter 4 Bowman acted negligently, relying primar negligence/liability and discussed at length ly on this court's decision in Diaz, 206 Kan. why the blinding light rule in Diaz should 650, 482 P.2d 48. Deal argues-and the Court not apply to the present facts. The majority of Appeals majority agreed-that it was inher- found that the holding in Diaz was premised ently unreasonable to enter into the intersec- on the fact that the "blinding light" was a sud- tion when the sun prevented Bowman from den occurrence of which the defendant had seeing whether there were any approaching no prior knowledge. The Court of Appeals cars, so Bowman was guilty of negligence as a distinguished the situation in Diaz from cases matter of law. where a person continues to drive in constant In Diaz, the plaintiff was driving west on a conditions that knowingly block or impair the street in Junction City late on a summer after- driver's vision. In cases involving the latter sit- noon when she came to a stop in order to turn uation, the driver is liable for negligence as a left into a parking lot. The defendant, who was matter of law. traveling in the same direction, rear-ended In this case, Bowman's undisputed tes- Diaz' vehicle, causing her injury. At trial, the timony was that he stopped at the stop sign defendant explained that "the sun suddenly at the intersection and carefully looked both flashed into his eyes, reflecting off the hood of directions. Although the western sun was his freshly washed and waxed automobile and causing quite a bit of glare from that direc- blinded him so that he did not see the plain- tion, he perceived that the intersection was tiff's car." 206 Kan. at 651, 482 P.2d 48. clear and began to proceed through the The district court granted the plaintiff's intersection at a speed of about 5 miles per motion for a directed verdict on the issue of hour. His vehicle then collided with the vehi- the defendant's negligence/liability, finding cle driven by Deal. Resolving all inferences that the defendant was negligent as a matter in the light most favorable to Bowman, as of law. This court reversed, finding that "if this court must do in reviewing a motion for the jury believed the defendant's testimony, judgment as a matter of law under K.S.A. it could have found that on account of being 60-250, Bowman did not violate a traffic law. suddenly blinded by the sun, he did not neg- The question was whether he behaved as a ligently operate his automobile." 206 Kan. at reasonably prudent driver would under sim- 652, 482 P.2d 48. ilar circumstances. In its explanation, the court explained that Negligence is the lack of due care. The its conclusion was consistent with the "blind- instances are relatively rare when the facts are ing light' rule," which states that "ordinarily a such that the court should say that as a matter motorist must correlate his ability to stop his of law the negligence alleged had been estab- vehicle within the distance objects can be seen lished. Before the court should make such a ahead; but the rule is subject to qualification holding the evidence should be so clear that and exception where there is a sudden change reasonable minds considering it could have in the motorist's situation not caused by his but one opinion; namely, that the party was own failure or neglect, and that where he is negligent. suddenly blinded so that he has no opportun In this case, the district court correctly nity to stop his vehicle or slacken his speed, he determined that the issue of whether Bowman would not be guilty of negligence as a matter acted reasonably by proceeding into the of law if he collides with something on the intersection-that is, whether he was neglig highway." 206 Kan. at 652, 482 P.2d 48. gent-was a question of fact to be determined The Court of Appeals majority dis- by the jury in light of all of the surrounding agreed that there was a factual question as to circumstances. 131 Introduction to Negligence Because we conclude that the district court Questions about the case: correctly denied Deal's motion for a judg ment as a matter of law, we similarly conclude 1. In the original trial case, was either that Deal's claims relating to the denial of his side found at fault? If not, why not? motion for a new trial-which was based on 2. Deal had no memory of the accident the same contention that Bowman's conduct and both sides agreed that he was not was negligent as a matter of law-are without at fault. So, what were the allegations merit. against defendant Deal? We affirm the district court's denial of 3. The court of appeals had a rule about con- Deal's motion for a judgment as a matter of stant conditions as opposed to sudden, law and the subsequent judgment in favor unexpected conditions. What is this rule? f Bowman. The decision by the Court of 4. In the supreme court, the decision cen- Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. tered around whether or not the defen- dant breached his duty to the plaintiff. According to the court, did he