Debating Global Development - Review: Chapter 8

Instructions: Chapter 8

• Identify and explain two distinct pieces of knowledge acquired from the chapter.
• Identify a specific assertion that you found to be in disagreement with, and provide a rationale for your dissent.
• Please indicate any terminology that you find to be unclear or insufficiently described.
• Enumerate any lingering inquiries you may have after to perusing the chapter.

Material that MUST be used:

Chapter 8: Is Foreign Aid Effective?

We have already discussed a wide range of policies and institutions that are vital to global development, but when most people think about poverty, they tend to focus on foreign aid. Debates about foreign aid are some of the most polarizing in the field. On one side stand critics such as former US Senator Jesse Helms, who regularly argued that US aid was akin to throwing money down a "rathole." On the other side are supporters such as Irish rock star Bono, who pleads with concertgoers and governments that aid saves millions of lives each year. Determining the effectiveness of foreign aid is crucial because the lack of effectiveness is often cited as a justification for reducing or withholding aid. If aid is a moral duty, but it is actually ineffective at reducing poverty, then why bother to give it at all?

In order to properly engage in a debate about foreign aid, we must first understand how aid is defined and how it relates to development.Official development assistance(ODA) is aid provided by donor governments to low- and middle-income countries, with the main purpose of promoting economic development and improving human welfare. Thus, aid given to wealthy countries and military assistance do not count as ODA. Most of the world's ODA is given by members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), a group of the world's wealthiest governments.

The DAC countries donated a record high of $161 billion in ODA in 2020, with the US as the largest donor in absolute terms, contributing $36 billion. However, global ODA represented only 0.3% of the DAC countries' GDP, far less than the 0.7% that donors collectively pledged at the Monterrey Conference in 2002. This raises the point that the quantity of aid can be measured in different ways, with different implications: as an absolute amount, as a percentage of donors' GDP, or as a per-capita amount in recipient countries. For example, while the US leads the world in the absolute quantity of aid given, this amount represents just 0.16% of its GDPfar below the DAC average. And while India is the largest recipient of aid in absolute terms, typically nations with smaller populations receive more aid on a per-capita basis.

Although ODA receives the most attention, the total quantity of the world's ODA is small in comparison to other economic activities between the Global North and the Global South, such as remittances(roughly $500 billion annually), FDI($600 billion), and international trade ($10 trillion). In addition, individuals and foundations give about $40 billion in private aid, which is a fraction of the ODA given by governments.

Aid can be provided in many different forms, including direct cash transfers, debt forgiveness, technical assistance (such as advice from experts in a given field), in-kind aid (such as food or medicine), and concessional loans (i.e., with a below-market interest rate). Aid can also be directed through different channels. About half of all development aid is given directly from one country to another (bilateral aid); about 30% is channeled through IGOs like the UN to carry out their own programming (multilateral aid); and about 20% is given to NGOs that work directly in the field.

Finally, it is important to recognize that donors have many different purposes in mind when giving foreign aid. Aid can achieve different goals in the recipient country, such as stimulating economic growth, supporting democratization, or providing stability during an economic crisis. It can also help a country fulfill the basic needs of its population, reform macroeconomic policies, end a violent conflict, or recover from a humanitarian disaster. In total, over the past fifty years, about 35% of all ODA was allocated to basic needs such as education and health; 21% for infrastructure such as transportation and energy; 15% for economic productivity such as agriculture and tourism; 6% for humanitarian aid, and 6% for debt relief (see the breakdown in Figure 8.1 below). Development aid can also serve the self-interests of the donor, such as gaining political allies, building security cooperation, supporting its own TNCs, expanding economic trade, reducing immigration, or gaining access to natural resources.

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Figure 8.1 Official Development Aid by Sector

The complexity of the international aid system should make us wary of anyone who makes sweeping generalizations about whether "all" aid is effective or not. For example, even the harshest critics of aid typically argue that humanitarian aid is necessary after a natural disaster or emergency. The important questions to ask are: In what circumstances is aid effective or not? How can we make aid more effective in promoting development and reducing poverty?

Nevertheless, this debate elicits extremely strong opinions on both sides. Critics argue not only that aid has failed to spur growth effectively, but that aid actually blocks development by setting destructive processes into motion. On the other hand, supporters of aid claim that, under the proper circumstances, aid is vital to saving lives, promoting economic growth, and ensuring a measure of global justice. While some critics want to get rid of long-term development aid altogether, supporters view aid as a lifeline for millions of people in extreme poverty.

Argument #1: Foreign Aid is Ineffective in Promoting Development

From the perspective of foreign aid's critics, aid simply has not and will not create long-lasting prosperity. They note that over $2 trillion in aid has poured into the African continent in the last sixty years, resulting in little more than persistent poverty, hunger, and economic stagnation.

Skeptics point to these lackluster outcomes as evidence of foreign aid's ineffectiveness. For them, aid is nothing more than a quick fix that not only fails to contribute to long-term development goals, but often creates more harm than good. They blame overzealous, self-interested donors that go into the Global South with little knowledge of local conditions and implement large-scale development projects that are inappropriate in those contexts (we discuss a few of these examples in Chapter 14). Substantial influxes of money combined with a lack of mutual accountability between donors and recipients can create disastrous effects for poor countries with weak institutions.

Supporters of foreign aid argue that it is effective at addressing small, micro-level needs. For example, a poor community suffering from polio might be helped by vaccine donations. However, what foreign aid fails to address are the long-term needs of these communities, or in the case of the community suffering from polio, improvements in health infrastructure and the root causes of vulnerability. As we discussed in Chapter 4, changes at the micro-level are not always correlated with improvements on a macro-level. So, while foreign aid may offer a temporary fix, it makes no imprint on national development or long-term prosperity. In fact, several cross-national studies conclude that foreign aid and economic growth are not correlated at all. Dambisa Moyo, a staunch critic of foreign aid, goes even further to say that foreign aid actually hinders economic growth. We know from Chapter 2 that economic growth is not the sole indicator for development. However, when critics turn to other measures of development, they find equally disappointing results. For example, foreign aid is not correlated with a reduction in income poverty or improved life expectancies. Perhaps even worse, income inequality tends to rise as a country receives more aid. Critics ask: if foreign aid doesn't lead to improvements in economic growth or other dimensions of development, what's the point?

Skeptics of foreign aid point to various causes of failure. The most common explanations focus on the actions (or inaction) of donors. Among their mistakes is pursuing their own self-interest at the expense of the beneficiary's needs. For example, it might be logical to assume that the poorest countries in the world receive the most aid, but in reality, less than half of all ODA goes to the 65 poorest countries in the world. Even when these countries do receive aid, approximately 60% of the time it is tied.Tied aidcan only be spent on goods and services from the donor country, which benefits the donor's economy but removes the opportunity from the recipient country to provide employment or stimulate growth in their own.

Since foreign aid is almost entirely voluntary, there is no effective system to hold donor countries accountable for the consequences of their aid. Donors tend to go into poor countries with little knowledge of historical or cultural contexts, yet still attempt to implement grand pre-determined projects. William Easterly refers to these overly ambitious donors as "Planners," and calls instead for a different type of donor, the "Searcher." Searchers are humble; they learn from community members; use trial and error; and make changes in response to feedback. The problem is, since foreign aid is often driven by self-interest, donors have no incentive to act like Searchers. If they've already gained influence in the region or improved their international reputation, why should they do more? The history of US foreign aid provides examples of both types of donors (see Figure 8.2 below). On an individual level, donors often experience theSamaritan's Dilemma, which convinces donors that making a contribution is enough to be a "good Samaritan," even if it causes harm. When donors actually do monitor their aid projects, they often conduct self-evaluations, which likely skews their results. This lack of true accountability generates foreign aid that is uncoordinated, unpredictable, and ineffective.

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[Box] Figure 8.2 US Foreign Aid

As the world's largest economy and the largest donor in absolute terms, the United States has had an oversized role in determining the shape of international aid. The history of US aid illustrates the diverse forms that aid can take, the combination of self-interested and humanitarian motives involved, and the helpful and harmful impacts that aid can have.

After World War Two ended, the US financed a massive aid program to Western Europe to rebuild societies torn apart by the war and gain new political allies. The Marshall Plan was generally deemed successful in helping to spur economic growth, encourage trade, and forge a political alliance against the Soviet Union. The US also provided aid through a similar program in Asia, with similar effectiveness in promoting development and building US alliances.

Other components of US aid over the decades have not been as successful. As we discuss in Chapter 12, much of US food aid since World War Two has proven to be expensive, slow, economically self-interested, and counter-productive to reducing hunger around the world. A large portion of US aid has also been directed to the pursuit of political self-interests, such as fighting communism during the Cold War or combatting terrorism after 2001. As a result, the US has frequently used foreign aid to prop up some of the world's most corrupt dictators, as long as they cooperated with its strategic goals. It is no wonder that much of the world views US rhetoric about democracy promotion and foreign aid with skepticism.

As a global superpower, the US has also played a dominant role in shaping the agenda of multilateral aid institutions, particularly the World Bank and IMF. As Chapter 7 discussed, these institutions used conditional loans to impose economic liberalization policies throughout the Global South, which produced highly controversial effects.

Lastly, we must remember that not all foreign aid is intended for development. Much of the US foreign aid budget is allocated to military security and directed to high-income countries (such as the $3 billion in annual US aid to Israel), so it does not count as ODA Thus, as with all discussions about foreign aid, we must be careful not to make overly broad generalizations. Aid can have both beneficial and harmful effects on development and poverty reduction, depending on its forms, channels, targets, and purposes.

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Another limit to the effectiveness of aid is that it is completely up to each donor how much they donate from year to year. This volatility causes poor countries to be vulnerable, subject to the whims of donors. Unable to depend on a consistent stream of revenue, recipients can't plan long-term development projects. When a donor suddenly gives a large aid package, recipient countries often have limited capacity to use the aid for productive purposes because of governmental inefficiency or weak public infrastructure. On top of this, countries in the Global South receive on average, 35,000 separate donations from at least twenty-five different donors every year. Keeping track of each separate budget and condition is both tedious and a burden on countries with scarce resources. It's no wonder why so much aid gets wasted. Nevertheless, attempts to make donations more coordinated can also turn donors into top-down Planners who don't respond to the specific needs of impoverished communities. The conversation around maximizing coordination versus focusing on flexible, local approaches is fiercely debated in foreign aid. Even when donors do make their aid coordinated and predictable, it can still create unintended consequences in LICs that may send them further backward in development.

Although most foreign aid does not aim to interfere with the internal politics of poor countries, aid often inadvertently worsens the political dynamics in LICs, such as weakening democracy and causing corruption. This is largely because aid increases government budgets, which may make public officials more inclined to divert money to their political supporters, a practice known asrent seeking. When leaders of poor countries receive a heavy dose of foreign aid, it relieves the pressure on them to implement sound economic policies that benefit their own citizens, or to build up their tax revenues. This lack of public accountability can lead to authoritarian behavior. Even worse, critics contend that foreign aid causes conflict because it heightens tensions between political parties and increases public spending, which might make a coup d'tat more likely. For these reasons, it is necessary for donors to understand the political climate in recipient countries so as not to worsen the situation.

In order to avoid these political repercussions, donors often attempt to reform recipient governments' policies by imposing conditionalityon their aid. As a reminder, conditionalities require countries to implement certain policies after they receive aid. The hope is that with these policies, recipients will be less vulnerable to the political and economic mismanagement associated with foreign aid. However, donors are often unsure which policies are most effective, and they give aid to countries even when they don't meet the requirements, rendering conditionalities virtually useless.As we saw in Chapter 7, the conditions themselves may also be unhelpful for poor countries' development, or may harm specific populations. As poor countries become accustomed to donors intervening in their politics, they can form a political dependency on powerful donors who dictate their policies from abroad. A similar relationship occurs when recipient countries begin to rely on donors for government revenue. If money is coming in, why search for other ways to fund development? This is known as aid dependency. Likewise, recipient countries may take more financial risks because they anticipate aid in the future that can help cushion negative outcomes (this concept is known as the moral hazard).

Even aid that is altruistically motivated can have unintended economic consequences that are harmful for development. One common example is the Dutch Disease, or the increase in domestic prices caused by vast inflows of foreign capital. As with the resource curse, aid causes inflation that makes basic needs more expensive for the very people the aid was intended to help, and it can stifle the export industries that a country needs to grow. A second example is that foreign aid can interfere in local markets and compete with local producers, sometimes putting them out of business. This is especially true for in-kind aid, like subsidized food that competes with local farmers or clothing donations that compete with local textile manufacturers. Why, then, do countries continue to donate? Without a system for effective monitoring and evaluation, most donors are simply unaware of, or not concerned about, the negative impacts of their contributions. As a result, lump sums of money or goods are donated every year that are ineffective or counter-productive.

For skeptics, these problems are not a bug to be fixed, but an inherent feature of the global system of foreign aid. Between their selfish motivations, lack of accountability, and weak coordination, donors often do more harm than good in poor countries. Even when donors do their research and respond to feedback from recipients, unintended consequences are still likely to occur. For these reasons, skeptics caution against using foreign aid as a cure for underdevelopment, trusting instead in free markets to provide opportunities for the poor to pull themselves out of poverty. For example, Dambisa Moyo argues that most aid can be replaced if LICs improve their trade relations, raise capital from the private bond market, and attract foreign investment. As Easterly affirms, "the world's poor will mostly determine their own fate by their own home-grown institutions and initiatives."

Argument #2: Aid Is Effective and Necessary for Development

On the other side of this debate are supporters who believe that foreign aid is both helpful and necessary in providing basic needs for people living in extreme poverty, spurring economic growth, and facilitating sustainable development. They draw from cross-national statistical studies and specific examples of successful aid interventions to provide evidence that aid works. For them, the question is not about whether foreign aid should be given, but how we can make it more effective. They argue that when aid is used correctly, it can be a powerful tool to reduce poverty and accelerate development.

First, it is worth addressing the main argument of some of the strongest critics of foreign aid, Easterly and Moyo. They claim that despite trillions of dollars in aid over the last sixty years, Africa is still the poorest continent in the world. They're not wrong, but they don't tell the whole story. Critics seem to conflate correlation with causation, implying that foreign aid is the cause of Africa's poverty and stagnant economic growth. However, it is equally possible that countries with the conditions that cause economic stagnation, such as being landlocked and conflict-prone, are also those that need and therefore receive more foreign aid. Further, many critics fail to mention that Sub-Saharan Africa has actually achieved robust GDP growth and poverty reduction, particularly since the early 2000s. Paul Collier, a large proponent of aid, concludes that foreign aid has played an important role in keeping Africa from falling even further behind the rest of the world. Additionally, Jeffrey Sachs notes that this $2 trillion, spread over decades among dozens of countries, does not amount to nearly as much as we might think. For example, only about $12 per recipient is actually sent to the African continent per year. Supporters ask, what would poor countries look like without the little aid that they do receive?

[Insert Think Again box]

Think Again: How would you respond to the argument: "We can't afford to give foreign aid when we have so many problems in our own country"?

Contrary to the argument of skeptics, supporters claim that aid does stimulate economic growth. In fact, while critics cite studies that find no correlation between aid and GDP growth, other studies have found a positive correlation between the two. Can they both be right? Technically, yes. Any single study is not conclusive because these studies vary across time, location, methodology, and context. For example, Burnside and Dollar find that aid is positively correlated with GDP growth, but only in countries with sound economic policies. Other scholars say that this correlation exists only up to a certain amount of aid. Thus, the relevant question is not about whether aid works in general, but about what kind of aid is effective and in what circumstances.

Foreign aid's supporters also point to other measures of development, from economic indicators to social well-being to political stability, in order to demonstrate the specific ways in which foreign aid has been effective. For example, while critics claim that foreign aid reduces domestic savings and private investment, Collier finds that aid increases FDI, as it makes poor countries more attractive to foreign investors. Similarly, although critics say that aid increases debt in poor countries, other studies suggest that aid is effective in reducing debt in countries with a large debt burden. On the community level, foreign aid brings new technology and skills that inspire innovation and growth in poor communities, as well as investments in education and healthcare that boost worker productivity. Perhaps most importantly, foreign aid has been found to be effective in reducing income poverty, especially in democratic countries and in countries that commit public spending toward poverty alleviation. Aid is also linked to improvements in people's ability to meet their basic needs. In fact, one study found that each percentage increase in foreign aid is linked to a .64% improvement in the recipient country's MPI score. Similarly, aid is correlated with better Gini and HDI scores, which measure income inequality and well-being. For optimists, it is clear that foreign aid is effective under the proper circumstances.

People say that money can't buy happiness, but can it buy democracy and political stability? According to supporters of foreign aid, it just might. Following the Cold War, technical assistance to poor countries increased dramatically and at the same time, democracy rose in 129 LICs. This relationship suggests that foreign aid and democracy are positively correlated. We cannot say conclusively that foreign aid was the cause of democracy in these countries. Nonetheless, supporters argue that foreign aid can help maintain democracy in poor countries during a political transition at a much lower cost than military intervention. Critics claim that aid causes corruption, and it is difficult to ignore that many of the world's poorest countries suffer from pervasive corruption. However, supporters of aid claim that it is poverty itself, not foreign aid, that causes the corruption trap, as we discussed in Chapter 4. While critics claim that foreign aid fuels conflict, Collier finds that foreign aid can help countries peacefully recover from conflict. Indeed, there are numerous examples of tangible improvements to development that are the direct result of foreign aid interventions.

For example, foreign aid played a crucial role in the global eradication of smallpox through the distribution of vaccines. Similarly, foreign aid has also helped to nearly eliminate polio, fund the widespread distribution of family planning resources, and create massive immunization campaigns in the Global South. Numerous studies, such as those described in Stephen Smith'sEnding Global Poverty, have detailed hundreds of effective aid projects operating at the grassroots level. In sum, supporters of foreign aid provide plenty of evidence of their own that aid can help to reduce poverty, build stronger institutions, and stimulate economic growth in recipient countries.

Supporters of foreign aid admit that aid doesn't always work, but rather than eliminating aid altogether, they focus on using the successes and failures of aid to determine how we can make it more effective. As we discussed in the previous section, many of the inefficiencies related to foreign aid are caused by reckless or self-interested donors. There are numerous ways in which donors can not only avoid overly centralized planning but also minimize unintended consequences in LICs. We now turn to thewho,what, andhowof making development aid more effective.

The countries that receive the most aid are not necessarily the poorest countries in the world. Because donors have self-interests and other goals in mind, just a third of all ODA goes to the world's lowest-income countries. Thus, one recommendation for improving aid is to ensure that aid is targeted to truly poor countries and to the most vulnerable communities. However, many of the world's LICs are simultaneously fraught with corruption and weak institutions, which critics say are exactly the type of countries donors should avoid. A possible solution to this problem is to give aid only to the governments in poor countries that have already demonstrated their commitment to human rights, good governance, and sound economic policies (all of which strengthen the impact of aid on growth). This is known asaid selectivity, in contrast to conditionality. Of course, selectivity can't be applied to all aid, since countries with dysfunctional governance are often those who need it the most. In order to reduce rent seeking with foreign aid in countries rife with corruption, Riddell suggests circumventing governments and working directly withcommunity-based organizations (CBOs), which are nonprofits that represent local communities. Now that we have a better understanding of the debates over who should receive aid, we now ask whatdonors should give.

Aid comes in many forms, and scholars have long debated the comparative effectiveness of each one. To some extent, the answer depends on how we define development. For short-term GDP growth, general budget support (i.e., funding the government directly) may be effective if the recipient government has growth-oriented policies in place. For long-term GDP growth, scholars recommend funding infrastructure and human capital that can facilitate trade and economic productivity. However, to target poverty reduction more directly, Sachs recommends using "known, proven, reliable, and appropriate" interventions that address the "Big 5" needs of the poor: agriculture, health, education, water and sanitation, and energy. Many development experts also highlight the importance of targeting aid toward women. They claim that female-focused aid not only empowers women, but it stimulates economic growth because women are more likely to invest aid in productive activities. For example,each percentage increase in female education is associated with a .37% increase in GDP. Finally, microfinance programs provide small loans to help entrepreneurs in poor communities increase their income through small businesses. But as we discuss in Chapter 15, microfinance is not necessarily a panacea for poverty.

Other forms of aid also have their own advantages and disadvantages. For example, technical assistance and in-kind aid are praised for being less susceptible to corruption in poor countries, but they are also viewed as being economically inefficient. Technical assistance often involves spending money on expensive consultants from the Global North, but some argue that this advice is necessary in establishing sound policies and institutions. In-kind aid is often necessary in humanitarian emergencies, but it is typically less effective at stimulating local economic growth. This is why supporters of aid agree that most aid should be disconnected from the economic interests of donors in order to support local industry. Similarly, most scholars argue in favor of giving aid in the form of grants rather than loans in order to reduce debt dependency in recipient countries. Again, the type of aid, or what donors contribute, should depend on the unique circumstances in each recipient country.

We will break up thehow into three parts: how should aid be channeled, how should it be implemented, and how much aid should be given?In terms of channeling aid, some scholars favor giving multilateral aid through institutions like UN development agencies because it is less politicized, more likely to go to the poorest countries, and more coordinated. Some studies find that multilateral aid is more highly correlated with poverty reduction than bilateral aid,but other scholars find no significant difference. Additionally, many scholars who are reticent about propping up a corrupt or authoritarian government argue in favor of channeling aid through NGOs instead. Like CBOs, NGOs are often more connected to the communities in which they work and have at least some form of evaluation and monitoring system. Studies show that 85% of NGO projects achieve their immediate goal and 75% have a high or moderate impact on the needs of their beneficiaries. On the other hand, NGOs often have little influence on LIC government policy, so their macro-level benefits may be limited (see Chapter 14 for a more thorough discussion on the role of NGOs and CBOs in development).

Recommendations for improving how aid is implemented often focus on strategies of accountability and coordination. When donors make contributions, they must hold themselves accountable and coordinate with one another to reduce inefficiencies and unintended consequences. To improve their accountability, countries should embody the characteristics of Easterly's Searcher model by engaging local communities directly in the planning and evaluation of development projects.In addition, it is important that donors hold their recipients accountable, and conditionalities may be useful in doing so, so long as they are well-researched and strictly upheld. Ultimately, both accountability and coordination are difficult to achieve when donors bring different interests and values to the table. However, Sachs believes that it is possible to create a system of "mutual accountability," where donors are responsive to each other, to their taxpayers, and to recipients, and where recipient governments are held accountable both to donors and to their own populations.

Finally, we ask how much aid is necessary to reduce poverty and spur development? In surveys across DAC countries, citizens often estimate that their governments give far more aid than they actually do. For example, US citizens believe their government devotes roughly 25% of its budget to development aid, but in reality it is less than 1%. According to Sachs and Riddell, such a small amount of aid will do little to make significant dents in poverty or positively impact growth. They claim that global contributions should be two or three times their current amounts, especially if foreign aid can provide the "big push" needed to escape the poverty traps we discussed in Chapter 4. As mentioned earlier, wealthy countries have pledged 0.7% of their GDP to foreign aid, and only six countries have honored this promise to date. If all DAC countries simply honored their own commitments, it would represent an additional $200-300 billion in financing for global development.

In sum, optimists contend that foreign aid is an essential tool in development. They point to the positive correlation between foreign aid and economic, social, and political dimensions of development, some of which directly contradict critics' findings. Supporters admit that foreign aid doesn't always work, but they argue that these problems can largely be addressed through well-designed, targeted aid that is given under the right circumstances. Instead of denouncing aid altogether, supporters look for ways to improve aid, because when used appropriately, it can save millions of lives and create a more level playing field between the Global North and South.

Conclusion

There is no simple answer to the question of whether foreign aid is effective or not. Perhaps the best answers are: "No one is certain" and "It depends." Development scholars disagree about the effectiveness of aid, partly because the empirical studies have produced contradictory findings. As in many of the other debates we've discussed in this book, these studies are based upon different cross-national data sets, time periods, and independent and dependent variables. Some cross-national studies have found that aid correlates positively with GDP growth, democracy, and the fulfillment of basic needsand other studies have not. On the local level, many evaluations have found that micro-level projects successfully completed their goals and led to positive outcomes for the communities they serve, but these achievements have not necessarily translated into sustained economic growth at the national level. Given the mixed empirical results, the truth about foreign aid is probably somewhere between the two extremes. Most aid is probably not "proven and reliable," as Sachs has claimed, but neither is it a barrier to development, as Moyo has argued.

It is also important to remember that aid is packaged in vastly different forms, through different channels, and for different purposes. Thus, the effectiveness of aid will inevitably depend on the who, what, and how of its implementation. For example, we cannot reasonably expect that a loan given to a dictator in a high-income country intended to strengthen a political alliance would have the same effect on poverty reduction as a targeted vaccination or microfinance program in a needy country. Ifaid is more narrowly focused on eliminating extreme poverty rather than a wider range of political and economic outcomes, it becomes a more feasible endeavor.

In general, development aid given by wealthy countries is dwarfed by the amount they spend on other political and economic priorities. For example, while DAC countries were giving $161 billion in ODA in 2020, they were spending over six times that amount on their own militaries. Yet the citizenry of these countries rarely question whether this level of military spending is effective in guaranteeing global security. Foreign aid is more easily criticized, even as citizens of the Global North dramatically overestimate its quantity, and DAC governments fail to fulfill their promise of giving 0.7% of GDP in aid. Thus, most development scholars hope that this debate helps to advance the conversation about how to improve the quality of aid, rather than as a justification to reduce or end it.