Question
Derrida, Brault, and Naas (1994) asserted a philosophy of psychoanalysis that claims madness is not necessarily a disease, but a cognitive process lacking reason. Do
Derrida, Brault, and Naas (1994) asserted a philosophy of psychoanalysis that claims "madness" is not necessarily a disease, but a cognitive process lacking reason. Do you agree? Why or why not? Does the philosophy of Derrida, Brault, and Naas affirm or refute Freudian principles? Explain.
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Qualitative Data Analysis With NVivo
Authors: Patricia Bazeley, Pat Bazeley, Kristi Jackson
2nd Edition
1446256561, 9781446256565
